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EPTEMBER 1988

A SOVIET WEEKLY
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NEW TIMES

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Burma, so peaceful until quite recently, is now in political turmoil: mass demonstrations for the democratization of socio-political life and for economic reform are seething on its city streets and squares. The country's current one-party system has wavered.
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OPINIONS

Vladimir Kuznetsov,
educator, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

■ I write in reply to the editors' invitation to discuss the issues raised in the articles "Time for resolute action" by Anatoly Butenko and "Towards tolerance" by Leonid Goldin (No. 33/88).

I'm not going to accuse bureaucrats of all sins, because there are different kinds of bureaucrat. Among them are executives and managers who are indispensable. We berate ministries without thinking that they are not independent either and are subordinate to higher authorities.

By declaring officialdom and wage-levelling the main enemies of perestroika, some authors lead us astray and lay the blame at the wrong door.

We should be talking, I repeat, not about bureaucrats in general, but about those of them who are not particularly interested in: a) the implementation of the socialist principle, "to each according to his work" (this does not apply to an executive or a factory manager), and b) the establishment of a truly law-governed state.

Who today can allow himself to flout the law with impunity? An ordinary worker, an intellectual, a factory manager? Incidentally, factory managers are forgiven for infringing on the rights of their subordinates alone. In all other cases they are afraid of breaking the law. So who can allow himself to transgress the law with impunity?

Another enemy of perestroika is wage-levelling. There is a grain of truth here. Nevertheless, the term is not exact or to the point. I do not think we should talk about wage-levelling, but about fair payment according to the work done, according to the final results.

Butenko's and Goldin's way of thinking very much appeals to me. I think they support a common cause, offering merely different tactics and means of promoting it. It would, of course, be better to argue with opponents. But the two authors do not enter into polemics, and, unfortunately, I have to argue with people who hold the same views as myself.

I favour a correct and tolerant attitude only in discussions. But how are we to treat people guilty of misdemeanours – from a position of tolerance (the term used by Goldin) or from the "can no longer be tolerated" position? There can be no tolerance of people tainted with corruption, or of profiteers and law breakers, including those who suppress criticism.

Anatoly Butenko sees all our troubles in our poor understanding of the objectives of our actions in perestroika, in our slack work, and in the absence of proper discipline on the part of workers and managers alike. What is meant by discipline? I am against such an interpretation of the inefficiency of perestroika.

The central question of perestroika is, in my opinion, the degree to which the people are linked with the means of production and the land and are aware of the possibility of owning the means of production and manufactured goods in reality, not in words.

Perestroika will be effective if the people regard the land and the fruits of their labour as their own, if they become real owners of the means of production, and feel that they are rewarded for their labour and not just for staying at their work places. If this does not happen, we shall have even harder times ahead than the period of stagnation.

The question of combining the posts of a district Party secretary and chairman of a district Soviet is now being discussed here. It is a correct step towards a gradual redistribution of power, but only under certain conditions – the comparative material independence of a worker, when his welfare does not depend on the opinion of his chief. Then he can boldly speak up and vote. But if a worker is threatened with dismissal for expressing his opinions and left without a livelihood, then he will stay silent, no matter how much he is exhorted to speak up. The promotion of the cooperative movement seems to open an alternative to this.

In my opinion, everything depends on whether people are able to earn their livings regardless of the moods and wishes of their bosses. People should be vitally interested in the production of material and cultural wealth, and they should know that it really belongs to them. The rest – political freedoms and guarantees – will then follow automatically.

By calling for tolerance in discussions, I do not want to be tolerant of those who commit injustices. Nevertheless, I have to be tolerant, because I have no means of fighting them.

In spite of all this, I believe perestroika will be successful.

CARRYING ON THE DISCUSSION

Lilia Shalganova,
Murmansk, U.S.S.R.

■ Though a long-standing subscriber to New Times, I have never written to you. Writing is your business, and mine is to read. Nevertheless, I decided to write to you after reading Turbin's article "The Power of Words" in a recent issue. (No. 31/88).

While reading an article, one usually agrees or disagrees with its author. In the case in question I agree with Turbin, because I share his views on many issues. At the same time, I feel some inward resistance to what he writes. Having read the article several times, I understood the reason for the rude words he uses. Though these words are not banned in literature, it is unnatural to hear them from a man who, he says, suffers from rough treatment in daily life.

If literary critics disapprove of these rude words, what can be expected of the people who use them. I think we should not judge people by their appearances, but try to see what they are really like. Turbin should consider who and what teaches us how to behave and speak, especially today, when many people look at the world through the eyes of the press and use words drawn from it, and reading long articles replaces their own thinking. I think journalists should spare no effort in trying to understand what things mean.

Y. Kurichev, 26,
lawyer, Sverdlovsk, U.S.S.R.

■ I have chanced to read New Times in the past, when it

GLASNOST

arried "Taking Up a Point." he replies were sometimes ven in a way that I could t make head or tail of. A pical picture of the 1970s d 1980s! Recently I bought issue of your magazine d could not tear myself way from it: topical articles, profound study of prob-ms, clarity of exposition, d a wide range of sub-cts.

In Sverdlovsk, where I live, ew Times is now very hard buy, and I have decided subscribe to it. I would the magazine to carry in "Profile Sketches" concise graphies of all members the Political Bureau of the mmunist Party, from the 20s to today, indicating ir merits and shortcom-gs. I think it would be in-esting for readers at home d abroad.

D. Ivanov
Tallinn, U.S.S.R.

■ Reading the latest issues of New Times, I had the impression of a magazine of the type published in the period of stagnation, 15 or 20 years ago. New Times entered the year 1988 at a new, higher level, but now carries flat articles with no substance. At the beginning of the year I saw long queues for New Times, and the magazine was handed from one person to the next, because all the articles were readable. This cannot be said of the magazine now. I am extremely disappointed, because with such a content it will be impossible to win more readers in other countries.

You would do well to invite Alexander Bovin, Yuri Afanasyev, Grigory Baklanov, Tatiana Zaslavskaya, Daniil Granin, Ales Adamovich, Yuri Karyakin and Gavriil Popov to make further contributions to the magazine.

AN ARTIST'S COMMENT

wing by Igor Smirnov

A MATTER AT ISSUE

Mikhail Galakhtin,
teacher of philosophy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

■ On reading Ksenia Myalo's article "The Kazan Phenomenon" in issues Nos.33 and 34, I reflected the Kazan phenomenon is not to be seen in isolation. What we have in Kazan is an aggravation of the general situation. For that reason the Kazan phenomenon should be examined as a real social problem, and not as discrete phenomenon to be tackled separately. What is at issue here is not just money, though, as distinct from in the West, it is not the main thing.

I would like to single out three aspects of the problem:

psychological: the pursuit of danger, solidarity, and group loyalty, with betrayal and meanness as things most to be scorned, consolidation along the lines of "insiders – outsiders";

social: a specific micro-community, a state within a state, is a reaction to the socio-pathological processes at work in society, a method of compensating for social tensions, and violence as a means of building an alternative model of behavior;

philosophical: escapism, which manifests itself in creative work (music, painting, sport) or in hard drinking and drug-addiction.

If life is such that a person is unable to resolve his internal conflict, then the consequence is death. Hence the monstrous cruelty and contempt for death on the part of the Kazan gangs, and Moscow rockers too. It will be recalled that nearly all crimes, including fights between Kazan gangs, have taken place in a fit of passion, fierce hatred of other people, even close companions.

Administrative measures of various kinds will merely aggravate the situation. Radical shifts in the social and cultural fields are needed. What is also needed, of course, is a conscious desire on the part of the individual to change the situation.

GLASNOST

REPERCUSSIONS

Richard J. Gilbert,
First Secretary and Press Attaché, U.S. embassy,
Moscow

■ I have read Galina Sidorova's articles in New Times on her visit to the United States. I have rarely encountered articles about the United States which I find so perceptive and so insightful. She has done a superb job.

I agree with Galina Sidorova that nothing is "simple or unambiguous" in our relationship. Like the author, I agree that we still have "miles to go." Her articles are a model for the kind of reporting we need about each other.

HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK

PRIVATE OPINION

PEREZ DE CUELLAR, Secretary-General of the United Nations

The opening of talks in Geneva between the official delegations of Iraq and Iran is, in my view, the main event of the past week. The meeting between diplomats of both countries is characterized by a normal working atmosphere. It is clear even now that the talks are not going to be easy. The two countries will have to go a long way to resolve the problems that have accumulated over the eight years of war.

I can note as positive the fact that both sides have so far observed the main provisions of Security Council Resolution 598. They are keeping to the cease-fire agreement, the implementations of which is being closely monitored by a U.N. team. The next stages in normalizing relations between Iraq and Iran require vigorous efforts from the two delegations. The solution of the complex problems that have arisen between the two Muslim peoples will undoubtedly help enhance the cause of peace, stability and security in the region. The talks are only in their intitial stage, and I would like them to develop more dynamically in the future.

VOLODIA TEITELBOIM, Member of the Political Commission, Communist Party of Chile

The lifting of the state of emergency in Chile, announced by Pinochet a few days ago, is a victory for the country's democratic forces, and the international movement of solidarity with it. It is not a sincere move on the part of the dictator. It is merely a demagogic propaganda trick designed to reduce discontent with his regime both in Chile and outside it. It is another ploy in the run-up to a fake plebiscite, a merely cosmetic operation by which Pinochet is trying to mask his ugly political face.

Only some of the repressive decrees have been annulled. But many others are still in force. The constitution of 1980, which contains numerous discriminatory provisions, remains unchanged. Article 8 bans the political activity of a large section of the left, including the Communist Party, the Socialist Party led by Clodomiro Almeyda, and the Left Revolutionary Movement. Deported Chileans objectionable to Pinochet are still unable to return home, and numerous political prisoners have not been released. As in the past, there are large numbers of public or secret decrees that allow the authorities to arrest citizens.

On the same day that the state of emergency was lifted, Admiral Merino declared that the authorities would crack down on those who took part in any protest movement. We hope that neither Chilean nor world public opinion will be deceived by this professional swindler, who is laying claim to the post of dictator for life.

ALES ADAMOVICH, Novelist, U.S.S.R.

The committee of the public movement Memorial and its sponsoring organizations have met to discuss the question of raising money for a monument to the victims of the personality cult and announce a competition for the monument.

The construction of a monument to the victims of the Stalin repressions should not mean the end of the movement. On the contrary, it is necessary to continue the spiritual and moral destalinization of our society. This will be served by the aim declared at the meeting: to set up a historical and educational centre at the memorial with its own archive and museum. The material about the Stalin repressions and their victims is to be collected throughout the country and sent to the committee's provisional address: 2, Chernyakhovsky Street, Moscow. In particular schoolchildren and other young people should be involved.

In the 1960s and 1970s the Stalinists and leading figures of the stagnation period openly declared that their aim was **to bypass the generation of the 20th Party Congress,** that is, those who had accepted the exposure of the Stalin cult as a warning: Never again! But the Stalinists had a different purpose: to blind the younger generation to the true facts of history. And they succeeded in doing so.

It is necessary to draw lessons from this experience and win the young people over from the have-beens so that they do not bypass us. Our young people should also become in spirit a "generation of the 20th Party Congress." Such is the purpose of the historical, educational and humane activity of the Memorial, which will rely on the purity and uncompromising moral standards of the young.

The events taking place in Burma can be likened to a storm, which has not abated even at the time of writing. It is not clear how the situation will develop, as such a rapid turn of events is an extraordinary and, in the case of Burma, unprecedented fact.

The crisis of power

Vladimir Vasilyev

What is happening in the country that proclaimed the "Burmese way to socialism" after the military coup in 1962? What sparked off the dramatic events of this summer, which sharply contrast with the usually even tenor of life in that land of golden-white Buddhist pagodas? For, over the past 25 years, Burma, with its 38-million-strong population, has virtually walled itself off from the rest of the world, even opting out of the non-aligned movement, and adopting a position of "super non-alignment."

It seemed to be an example of political stability maintained by a strong government which relied both directly and indirectly on the army and spoke loudly on behalf of the people. The idea of General Ne Win being irreplaceable and the existing regime immutable was accepted not only in Burma but, to some extent, outside it. Burmese political traditions an the dominant Buddhist ethic, which calls for humility and contentment with what one has, also seemed to militate against any change.

But suddenly the notion of the Burmese being a submissive nation has been blown to smithereens. Of course, it was not entirely unexpected. The crisis of the country's economic and political structures and the methods of running society there had been brewing for a long time and has now dramatically exploded.

Vladimir Vasilyev, D. Sc. (Hist.), is the author of "Essays on Burmese History."

The successes achieved by the country since 1962, when the Revolutionary Council came to power and the "Burmese way to socialism" was adopted, should not be ignored. A number of progressive reforms have been carried out in the social and economic spheres. The peasants enjoy secure land tenure. The public education system has developed on a wide scale, and free medical care has been extended.

Soviet people know little about present-day Burma, and usually good news has been reported from that country. The media have kept silent about its difficulties and, moreover, failures and miscalculations, acquainting the Soviet public with "gross" indices, so to say: the number of radical reforms carried out in Burma (and the more resolutely, the better), the number of privately-owned factories transferred to public ownership and of foreign firms ousted from the domestic market, the percentage to which the private sector has been reduced, and what new bodies of state power have been set up.

It is important, however, to know, whether the reforms proved effective or not, how the newly formed bodies function, and whether they contribute to economic growth.

By the mid-1980s whole branches of the economy had become stagnant, and in some of them the growth of output had even stopped. The rice yield had ceased to increase and, with present technical standards, the potential for growth had been virtually exhausted. The output of oil no longer satisfied even modest domestic needs, and it had to be imported.

Many plants in the mining and manufacturing industries now stand idle because of shortages of raw materials, spare parts and fuel. Export earnings have dropped considerably, due for the most part to the fall in world prices for rice. As a result, the import of raw materials, spare parts and medicines has had to be cut down. The foreign debt has risen, exceeding four billion dollars, and over half of export earnings go on annual payments of the debt. Inflation is soaring.

All this has brought living standards down, especially in towns. The per capita annual income is still under 200 dollars. At the end of 1987 the United Nations included Burma on the list of the ten "least developed nations."

There are, of course, international factors common to the majority of developing nations which also adversely affect the Burmese economy. But the main causes of the crisis state of the economy should be sought inside the country. They are, I believe, the excessive nationalization of a backward economy, bureaucratic methods of administration by mere injuction, the suppression of private enterprise, weak as it is, in the economic sphere, and the country's effective isolation from the outside world (the complete rejection of foreign investment, mixed companies, etc.)

I believe revolutionary changes in a backward economy to be unproductive and even out of place, especially without considerable foreign support. A backward economy should first of all be developed by creating extensive opportunities for the growth of productive forces in all its branches. Otherwise, reforms will come to little more than a "shifting" of the backwardness from one sector to another.

It would be wrong to say that the Burmese leaders were not aware of the criti-

cal state of the national economy. But only in the latter half of 1987 did they begin to talk of mistakes and failures and the need for changes in their policy. But, it was too late.

The abolition of government control over the sale of the nine principal agricultural crops, including rice, in September of last year has been the most important economic measure carried out so far. The measure is expected to stimulate the interest of peasants in raising agricultural output and supplying goods to towns. The government allowed private traders to export rice and simultaneously withdrew valuable banknotes from circulation without compensation (exchange) with a view to striking a decisive blow at the numerous black market dealers. However, the measure also hurt the interests of ordinary people, and manufacturers and tradesmen who carry on their business lawfully.

On the whole, the measures taken since last autumn have not improved the state of the economy (for too little time has passed) and, even less so, the living standards of the people. The standard of living has even deteriorated, because prices have been steadily rising.

How did the political situation develop in these circumstances?

It will be recalled that, outwardly, relative political stability was observed in the country, with the sole reservation that anti-government rebels have been active since 1948 in fringe areas. But with the growth of economic difficulties, political stability began to decline. Students and people from other walks of life intermittently held demonstrations. The brutal suppression of marches aroused profound indignation, especially among students, making them irreconcilable to the regime. Students became the vanguard of the broad anti-government movement calling for changes in the present system and for extensive political and economic reforms.

There is a temptation to explain the latest events in Burma in terms of a conspiracy by internal reactionary and external imperialist forces, inciting the discontented people to action against the lawful authorities. However, the anti-government action has deeper roots, and matters should not be simplified here, especially now when the struggle for democracy and human rights is gaining momentum.

The question of democracy is particularly relevant. It is alleged that the East has no traditions of democracy and hence that there are no grounds to expect that democracy will develop there. According to this theory democratic forms of government in the East are considered unlikely, while authoritarian rule in its different forms is regarded as an almost indisputable fact.

The peoples of the East have, indeed, known little democracy in their history. However, the desire for democracy and human rights arose there long ago, and will continue to grow steadily. Burma is no exception in this respect. The allegation that a socialist orientation, once proclaimed, will solve radical problems is either a conscientious delusion or a deliberate lie, especially when the military are at the helm of state.

Commenting on the latest events in Burma, Robert Taylor, a noted expert on Burmese affairs, said recently: "This is a mess the Burmese have made for themselves. They can't blame the CIA, they can't blame multinational corporations, they can't blame the KGB, they can't blame the Chinese Communist Party. The Burmese did it themselves and the Burmese are to sort it out themselves."

The latest changes in the leadership are not expected to resolve the pressing problems confronting Burma with regard to its economy and policy, democracy and the country's future.

Flashbacks

January 4, 1948. Burmese independence proclaimed.

March 2, 1962. A group of officers led by General Ne Win staged a coup. The Burmese Revolutionary Council set up by them published a declaration entitled "The Burmese Way to Socialism." In the same year initial steps were made towards founding the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP).

March 28, 1964. The Revolutionary Council adopted a law on national unity under which a one-party system was introduced. All parties other than the BSPP were dissolved.

September 1987. Students demonstrated in different cities in protest against the withdrawal of valuable banknotes from circulation without compensation. All universities and schools were closed for six weeks.

March 1988. Student riots erupted in Rangoon. They were brutally suppressed by police.

June 1988. Clashes between demonstrators and police broke out again; several demonstrators were hurt, and colleges were closed.

July 1988. Riots in Rangoon, Taunggyi and Pyi.

July 23. A special congress of the Burma Socialist Programme Party opened in Rangoon. The 77-year-old leader of the party, Ne Win, resigned as Chairman of the Central Committee. President San Yu resigned as well. The congress turned down Ne Win's call for a referendum as to whether the one-party system should continue or a multi-party one be introduced. The BSPP General Secretary retired General Aye Ko, outlined the main directions, of the economic reforms needed by the country: encouragement of private initiative, and permission to start private businesses in all branches of the economy (except in the oil industry and the mining of precious stones) and set up joint ventures with foreign businesses. Retired General Sein Lwin was elected Chairman of the Party's Central Committee and President of the state.

August 1988. Mass demonstrations in dozens of cities. Students were joined by Buddhist monks, lawyers, physicians, workers and people from other urban strata. On August 3 martial law was imposed in Rangoon.

August 12. Sein Lwin resigned as Chairman of the Party and head of state after only 17 days in office.

August 19. A special meeting of the BSPP Central Committee and an emergency session of the People's Assembly were held. Dr Maung Maung was elected Chairman of the Party and President of the republic. He is the first civilian to head the ruling party and the state in the past 26 years.

Following Dr Maung Maung's election, mass demonstrations and strikes go on from day to day in many towns. They involve people from all walks of life, civil servants included. They demand radical democratic reforms in the country's political system and economy.

August 24 – the curfew lifted in Rangoon and Pyi. In a radio and television address, Dr Maung Maung tells the nation that the party will hold an extraordinary congress on September 12 to consider the question of conducting a national referendum on a changeover to a multi-party system.

All those detained on charges of anti-government action have been released.

Public committees take over control in a number of towns. Word has come that the Union for Democracy and Peace, opposed to the government and headed U Nu (Burma's Prime Minister until 1962), has been formed.

"The worst is over"

Kampuchea's 37-year-old Premier Hun Sen is interviewed by New Times

A perceptible psychological change has come about in the Kampuchean situation. All the participants in the meeting in Bogor, Indonesia, except the Khmer Rouge, agreed that the evacuation of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea must not lead to the restoration of the Pol Pot regime.



The Kampuchean government's stand and its efforts to achieve an early settlement were backed by the international conference on national reconciliation in Kampuchea, dialogue and cooperation in Southeast Asia, held in Pnompenh in the first half of August on the initiative of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization.

During the conference Premier Hun Sen granted an interview to our correspondent, the first to a foreign journalist since the Bogor meeting.

New Times has already reported on the political results of the first informal meeting on a Kampuchean settlement. But it would be interesting to know how your personal relations developed in Bogor with the leaders of the three opposing groups. For instance, did you shake hands with them?

We not only shook hands. We dined at a single table with the Son Sann and Norodom Ranariddh (son of Rorodom Sihanouk) factions. In Bogor, we established good human relations and held fruitful businesslike discussions. This can be said not only of our talks but also of our contacts outside the meeting.

We also shook hands with members of the Khmer Rouge delegation and even exchanged courtesies. But since the group, as you know, is opposed to national reconciliation, contacts between us could not be warm.

But they were nevertheless correct?

Yes, they were correct. The Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan has a brother, Khieu Sangkim, who works in Pnompenh, teaching at the Art School. At a dinner given by the host country I asked Khieu Samphan whether he wanted to convey a message to his brother. Samphan replied that he did not, because he had nothing to talk to him about.

When you say that Pol Pot and his close associates must not be allowed to return to power, whom do you mean specifically and how many people are involved?

We recognize the right of the Khmer Rouge as a political organization to take part in a settlement of the conflict. But we cannot agree, first, to the participation of its leaders (a list of whom we'll make known later) in the future structure of power and, secondly, to the legalization of its armed formations, because they are an instrument by means of which the Pol Pot group could seize power again.

Our people have suffered much from the Pol Pot regime. That is why we insist that it should be disbanded and disarmed. This does not mean that we are going to liquidate its members physically. But the Khmer Rouge's armed organization must be disbanded.

Could Khmer Rouge combatants be admitted later, on an individual basis, so to say, to the national army of Kampuchea?

We do not agree to the inclusion of Khmer Rouge armed formations in the national army by a coalition government even in the future. But after the Pol Pot armed forces have been disbanded, their men and officers will naturally become ordinary citizens of the republic.

Without having the right to join the national army?

Of course, it will take some time before any of them can be called up or enlisted in the national army.

You have mentioned a list of Pol Pot's close associates. Will it be long or short?

In the interest of an early national reconciliation, the list will be short.

It seems the Bogor meeting could lead to a new alignment of forces: the three-party coalition now opposed to the Kampuchean government may be replaced by a coalition between the government in Pnompenh and the Sihanouk and Son Sann groups, while the Khmer Rouge group will find itself in isolation.

This could happen under certain conditions. But on the whole the situation is indeed developing in this direction. It is obvious even today that the Kampuchean problem can be settled either through an agreement between all four parties or through the conclusion of agreements between the majority of them: our government, Norodom Sihanouk and the Son Sann group. The Khieu Samphan group will then be isolated.

How would you explain Sihanouk's different, somewhat contradictory statements about the outcome of the informal meeting in Indonesia? In Jakarta, he described the Bogor meeting as very productive and, on arriving in Peking, he said it had been fruitless.

I think Norodom Sihanouk knows what to say and where. In Peking, he had to say that the informal meeting in Bogor had brought no positive results, whereas in Jakarta he had to talk about good results. It all depends on the audience he is addressing.

Do you see any change in Peking's stand on the Kampuchean issue or is it continuing to give its support exclusively to the Khmer Rouge, so that this determines the Chinese stand as a whole?

We have not yet seen any sign of a change in the Chinese position, and in this connection Peking has found itself in a very difficult situation in defining its strategy towards South Asia generally, and Kampuchea in particular.

Peking is trying to play off Southeast Asian countries against Kampuchea, Vietnam and Laos. However, Southeast Asian states are now cooperating with us in a bid to wrench the Khmer Rouge from China. I feel that even the United States is exerting pressure on China, trying to persuade it to give up comprehensive support to the Khmer Rouge.

Now the army of People's Kampuchea has its own aviation.

Is there any change in the United States' position on the Kampuchean issue?

There is only one point on which we and the United States hold a common point of view: Washington does not want to see the Khmer Rouge in power again either. The United States favours the idea of sending an international peace-keeping force to our country in the process of settlement – ostensibly to hold back the Khmer Rouge and, in effect, to weaken the government and simultaneously strengthen the positions of Sihanouk and Sann, whose groups the United States backs and considers useful to itself.

The participants in the Bogor meeting decided to form a working group. When will such a group start working and where?

It is hard to say now when a group will be set up. But I think it will meet very soon.

In Indonesia?

That will be agreed on later.

Let me ask you a personal question. You are simultaneously premier and foreign minister. Isn't it difficult to hold two high posts? Aren't you going to hand over the post of foreign minister to somebody else?

It is, of course, very difficult to occupy two such posts simultaneously and, most importantly, to carry out these duties effectively. Once I tried to give up the post of foreign minister, but the Political Bureau of the party decided that I should keep it for practical reasons: the international situation around Kampuchea is changing very quickly, and it is necessary to adopt responsible decisions immediately, in the course of talks and meetings.

When did your political career begin?

Considering my age, 37, I served in the army for a long time. When in the latter half of the 1970s I saw that the Pol Pot leadership had staged a bloodbath, murdering millions of people, my transition to political activity became inevitable.

I am doing my work more or less effectively, perhaps for the reason that in the army I was a political officer. So political work was, as it were, a preparation for my present activity.

I have to master the art of statesmanship and running the country in the course of practical work, and mistakes and miscalculations are therefore to some extent inevitable. I see my prime task in steadily championing the vital interests of the much-suffering Kampuchean people.

How have the international positions of People's Kampuchea changed in the last ten years? Not very many countries have recognized the republic.

The West and China have tried hard to isolate our country, to ostracize it, so to say. I think it is for this reason that Kampuchea's external ties are not as broad now as they could be. Nevertheless, we have close relations not only with socialist countries but also with several developing, non-aligned states. In all, we maintain relations with 36 countries and four national liberation movements. Now that the prospect of a Kampuchean settlement has become real, the process of recognition will clearly develop more rapidly. In any case, the representatives of a number of Asian countries spoke with me on this subject in Indonesia.

What is the present economic situation in Kampuchea?

I don't think it can be described either as very good or very bad. The hardest times are over, in my opinion, and the prospects are favourable. The last year or two have perhaps been the most auspicious for our economy.

First, the prices of foodstuffs and most articles of prime necessity have now been stable for over a year. Supply has improved thanks to the introduction of a free open market last year. The gap between supply and demand is narrowing. However, there are still shortages of popular goods and foodstuffs.

Secondly, the gap between government expenditure and revenue is gradually diminishing, but it has not yet been closed, as our resources are rather limited.

Thirdly, the gap between imports and exports is perhaps especially wide, though it has reduced somewhat. We are trying to boost our exports, but our possibilities are rather modest in this respect.

Fourthly, the correlation between the incomes of the population and the level of prices. Some of the main foodstuffs are distributed in limited quantities among government employees and workers at state-owned enterprises at fixed low prices. But their wages and salaries are not high enough to buy other goods on the free market. We are trying to raise pay little by little.

Do you have enough rice now?

We estimate the present shortage of rice in the country at 100,000 tons. However, if maize, grain and other food crops are taken into account, food supplies will be adequate. So it can be said that we have achieved self-sufficiency in this respect – at a modest level, of course. The state purchases rice from peasants in the quantities set by the plan. Enough rice is left in their stores after for personal consumption, while many peasants are even able to sell some of their rice on the free market. I can say with certainty that there is now enough food everywhere – in every district, every province.

I would like to ask in conclusion how you assess the state of Soviet-Kampuchean relations in the political, economic and other spheres?

Our relations are characterized by close friendship and brotherhood. The all-round assistance given by the Soviet Union and Vietnam has enabled our republic to survive. We are deeply grateful to the Soviet Union, its government and people.

Our economic relations or, more precisely, Soviet aid and assistance to Kampuchea, considering the volume of this help, have been and remain very important to us. A great many installations in our country, especially soon after liberation when we felt an acute need to rebuild the life disrupted by the Pol Pot regime, have been constructed, restored and commissioned with the help of Soviet experts and thanks to the delivery of Soviet goods, machines and other equipment.

The vital importance of one kilogram or one metre of this or that product supplied by the Soviet Union to Kampuchea in those years cannot be compared with even 100 metres or 100 kilograms received from anyone today.

However, a considerable proportion of Soviet aid – let me say this frankly, in the spirit of glasnost – is now being used to little or no effect.

How would you explain that?

Both sides are to blame. The fault of your planning bodies and experts in foreign economic relations is that they take inadequate account of our current requirements and our possibilities of using one or other installation built with Soviet assistance or projects now under construction, financing them and providing skilled personnel. We are also to blame in that we cannot determine exactly what our country now needs in the first place and in what respect precisely the Soviet Union, and not any other country, can help us.

This today is the most serious problem in our economic relations. They should be made really effective. The resources of Kampuchea and the Soviet Union should not be wasted. They are not limitless in your country either. The appropriate Kampuchean and Soviet departments and services are now searching for fields where cooperation could be most effective for both countries. They are coordinating practical requirements and possibilities, terms and schedules. I hope that the restructuring of the economic mechanism in the Soviet Union and our more sensible view of things will help make Soviet-Kampuchean economic relations really effective.

Alexander Usvatov
our special correspondent
PNOMPENH, August

Photos by author and the newspaper Procheachon (Kampuchea)

PRIVATE OPINION

BILLY LIEB, a participant of the Soviet-American peace walk across the Ukraine, a World War II veteran

I am 65, a cameraman and film editor. First came to your country in 1979 for a Mt. Elbrus climb. Upon meeting Soviet people, realized they are no enemies. Retired on pension three years ago and decided to become a people's diplomat. Now I am both a war and a peace march veteran. Walked across the U.S. in the Great Peace March, from Leningrad to Moscow and from Washington to San Francisco in Soviet-American walks. Now walking across the Ukraine.

Why walks? First, I like walking. Second, you meet a lot of different people as you walk along, learn to understand them, and this is the most important thing. Back home, I tell people what I've seen and learnt. Unfortunately, we see far less Soviet people in the States than you do Americans here. Man-to-man contacts serve to destroy the enemy image quicker. My Soviet veteran friends and I discuss the ideas of family exchanges, of "adopting" each other's children.

I pin great hopes on the changes now under way in your country, on the explosion of initiative. People have become more open. This has manifested itself in our marches across the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. which have been major milestones in the Soviet-American people's diplomacy.

I feel like "walking for peace" for as long as it is necessary. When there is no more need for such walks, I'll keep walking around the Soviet Union just for the fun of it.

The holiday season drawing to a close

France's new political season, which begins this autumn, could produce a lot of surprises.

August is a holiday month. One has the impression that France is defunct. Business is almost at a standstill. Fifty per cent of enterprises are closed. Output is down by a third. While blue- and white-collar workers – who can afford it – and their bosses bask on beaches in the sun and overcome the nervous excitement generated by the presidential and parliamentary electoral steeplechases, politicians have more important things to attend to. For them the electoral hustings have been superceded by post-electoral bustle. In July and August the country's major parties, the ruling Socialist Party and the opposition Union for French Democracy and Alliance for the Republic, regrouped to rally their strength for the autumn political season which, beginning in September, has a host of surprises in store for them. It is expected that the debates on next year's budget will make for a pitched battle in the Palais Bourbon when the National Assembly meets.

The Year 1992

In the media the date December 31, 1992, is like a death knell as that is the day on which the single European market is to open. In it, says the U.S. News and World Report, "goods and people will then move as easily from Portugal to Germany, as they now do from Iowa to Michigan." (Incidentally I personally feel that our political scientists should long ago have started approaching EEC problems as those of a single confederated state, which with each passing year is acquiring increasingly clearer contours, and not as "an artifical conglomerate" torn by "irreconcilable contradictions.")

France unfortunately is still not prepared completely to dismantle all the economic, juridical, financial, social, tax and other barriers erected to protect its economy, which is lagging increasigly behind its competitors. (Although currently the industrial situation is somewhat brisker.)

Psychologically, too, the French are ill-prepared to accept the new state of affairs. The latest public opinion polls show the most painful issues to be unemployment, living standards, and education, with the building of a "United States of Europe" last on the list of priorities.

Michel Rocard

To believe these opinion polls, most are opposed to drastic change. The preference is for the fullest retention of earlier gains, especially the still remaining social ones. This was one reason why Francois Mitterrand defeated his rival Jacques Chirac in the wrangle for the Palais de l'Elysée. The country rejected the ex-Premier's charges against the President, regarding his alleged "immobility and passiveness" as fidelity to stability and the bedrock socio-economic status quo, of which the present head of state was seen as guarantor. Not everything is so simple though.

Today France is almost the only West European country with a comparativly powerful presidential regime, for which de Gaulle laid the ground thirty years ago. By means of the general's Fifth Republic France leaped from the status of an average agrarian-industrial nation to that of a leading industrialized power. In turn, the survival at the helm of de Gaulle and other presidents directly depended on how quick they were to sense new developments and made way for them, how ably they paved the way for the scientific and technological revolution, and promoted the more dynamic transnational corporations, without encroaching too far on the interests of other segments of the national bourgeoisie, and, in particular, without economic and technological breakthroughs generating tensions that could "smash the barrack," a phrase current in the 1968 youth movement.

François Mitterrand's election to a second term is the reward and advance the ruling class has granted him for adhering to this line. Without speeding things up and at the same time without anticipating events to too great an extent, he stuck to the accepted course, endeavouring as far as possible to adapt to the changing state of affairs. Thus, unlike previous Fifth Republic presidents, he invested the prime minister with greater freedom of manoeuvre in running the country and coping with such daily problems as the campaign against unemployment, which had reached 3.6 million, and terrorism, and in economic management, while reserving for himself overall strategy, diplomacy and defence.

However, recently Marianne has been lagging behind the spurts of her EEC partners. On uphill laps she has begun to gasp for breath. The increasingly oppressive power of the financial oligarchy, which dictates its own policy, interested more in stock exchange coups than the scientific and technological revolution or the modernization of an industry choked by lack of investment and personnel, plus the petrified state of the constitutional institutions amount, along with many other things, to a ball and chain dragging at her feet.

To date the country's leaders have failed radically to modify the balance of forces between speculators and financiers, on the one hand, and the industrial bourgeoisie, on the other, in a way that would favour the latter. Judging from Socialist Prime Minister Michel Rocard's first steps, he prefers intricate economic and socio-political manoeuvring. The ruling class is pinning great hopes on the rotation of left-of-centre and right-of-

centre cabinets. During his term of office ex-President Valery Giscard d'Estaing had sought to place such a two-stroke engine in the French locomotive. Incidentally, he may now take over as a future Prime Minister or even a future President, representing as he does the interests of the super-technocratic Europeanized French bourgeoisie. However, to date only François Mitterrand has succeeded in that. The idea is to neutralize the Communists, who wield great authority in the trade unions (the prime target of employers) and in local government and public organizations. What he seeks is to muster the potential of the middle classes as a bulwark against pressure from below.

In the seventies the conditions were not yet ripe for that. However, the eighties offer a different option.

Right or left?

The latest parliamentary and local government elections have demonstrated, and not just in France moreover, that the middle classes are steadily gaining in number, influence and activity. Ideologically, they lean basically towards the centre parties – the Socialist Party, the Union for French Democracy and the Alliance for the Republic – of whom all recent cabinets have largely been made up. The country's changed socio-political scene which the scientific and technological revolution has generated has served to erode a major pillar of the Fifth Republic, the two-round majority system of voting when a candidate polling 30 per cent of the vote in the first round can count on an absolute majority in the second. Although this did not reflect the real balance of forces, it made for a strong ruling majority, which in turn stabilized presidential and government authority while drastically circumscribing the opposition's impact on government and key decision making.

However, this year's elections produced a surprise as, for the first time in the Fifth Republic's history, the results did not produce an absolute majority. The borderline between the opposing political blocs is blurred. The old division into right and left confronting one another, even given divergence and rivalry within coalitions, is now becoming a thing of the past. Instead of the previous barriers, we now have new lines of demarcation, some of them splitting parties and factions. Forming his cabinet, the Socialist PM Michel Rocard offered posts to middle-of-the-road men from the right-wing opposition, although far from everyone in the Socialist Party supported him in doing so.

Similar divergencies are also to be observed on the other side. Giscard d'Estaing, who is quickly gaining ground and wants to capitalize on Jacques Chirac's presidential defeat in order to rally the entire opposition to his standard and make the Unionists a powerful European party, does not rule out the option of collaborating with the Socialists. Incidentally, the ruling class regards the Unionists as the reserve force should the Rocard cabinet fail to achieve its objectives. In the meantime the "left-right" (as it is already known) administration is exploiting its chance to treat Marianne for such old complaints as slow economic growth,

From Anna Yaroslavna to General de Gaulle

Muscovites on France and its people

International peace barometer

The Institute of Sociological Research of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences has taken part in an international comparative opinion poll conducted by the French firm SOFRES for the newspaper Le Figaro. The theme of the survey, conducted over the telephone, was "The Image of France and the French." In Moscow, 500 people were called.

What are the findings? Most Moscovites (78 per cent) like France, one per cent dislike it, 13 per cent feel neither sympathy nor antipathy, and eight per cent are undecided. The greatest sympathy for France is felt by people within the 18–19 and 25–29 age brackets as well as the middle generation, i.e., people aged 35–50, and intellectuals with higher education.

What are the French like? They are pleasant (78 per cent), resourceful (71 per cent), well-mannered (73 per cent), amiable (70 per cent), energetic (69 per cent). A somewhat lower number of respondents (40–50 per cent) felt that the French are courageous and simple people, and only 38 per cent thought them serious. Among the negative traits mentioned were hypocrisy, dishonesty, coldness, aggressiveness, indolence and attachment to outdated attitudes (6–10 per cent), talkativeness (48 per cent), arrogance (38 per cent) and obstinacy (23 per cent).

One question put by SOFRES was somewhat unusual for sociological surveys in this country: "If the opportunity presented itself, would you like to have a love affair with a French man or woman?" We asked it in three different forms: "Would you like to have a French man (woman) for an intimate friend?" To this, 49 per cent replied yes, 20 per cent no and the rest did not answer the question. "Would you like to marry a French man or woman?" Only 16 per cent said they would, while 47 per cent found it unacceptable.

Asked if they would like to have a love affair with a French man or woman 20 per cent said yes, 35 per cent said no and 45 per cent evaded the question.

What do Muscovites think about the French standard of living?

One in five people thinks that France is richer than the other European countries, one in two thinks it neither poorer nor richer than the other European countries and only 8 per cent think it poorer.

Which aspects of French life contribute most to the shaping of ideas about the country?

More than half of all Muscovites (51.3 per cent) mentioned the French taste for the good life. (Asked what they meant by the good life, the respondents said good food, luxury goods, wines, fashions and perfumes); 20 per cent noted technological achievements, such as high-speed trains, the Concorde plane and computers.

Most Muscovites (60 per cent) believe the present state of relations between the U.S.S.R. and France to be satisfactory, 2 per cent think relations excellent, 34 per cent – good and 2 per cent – bad and very bad. A large body (40 per cent) think relations were best under President de Gaulle.

What do Moscovites remember of the history of Russo-French relations? The 1812 War against Napoleon, the French Revolution, the Paris Commune, Le Resistance, the "Normandy-Nieman" air regiment during World War II, the Crimean War (the defence of Sebastopol), the emigration of Russian intellectuals to France after the Revolution of October 1917, trade and economic ties (Cardin, joint production of perfumes) and Anna Yaroslavna, who married a French king.

Of the 500 people polled, only ten had visited France.

Elena Bashkirova, Cand. Sc. (Philosophy)
Valery Mansurov, D. Sc. (Philosophy)

structural debility, low competitiveness, financial disparities, foreign trade and balance-of-payments imbalances and much else.

The budget the cabinet offers leaves little room for manoeuvre. In autumn the National Assembly will endorse or reject it along with other bills, which include a timid attempt to restore, albeit in a more modest form than before, the tax on the wealthiest that Jacques Chirac abolished, in order to raise the minimum wage. However, this half-hearted measure has already run into stiff resistance from the better-off. François Perigot, President of the French Employers' Federation, significantly warned Rocard not to imperil free enterprise. All the French know only too well what such warnings imply. Nevertheless, Edouard Balladur, an ex-Finance Minister of the right-wing cabinet, deemed it his civic duty to remind them the following:

"In France, various taxes levied on big fortunes are almost twice as high as those in the F.R.G. Still Western Germany is worried by the fact that fiscal charges ... are too high. The liberalization of the movement of capitals in Europe (planned by the EEC – L.M.) will lead to a massive transfer of savings to Luxemburg, for instance... It is only given restrictions on capital transfers that we can build up a 'single European market' and, at the same time, to keep the level of taxation on fortunes and savings in France higher than that in the F.R.G., let alone Britain. The choice is ours."

It is hardly likely that by socio-popolitical manoeuvring the cabinet will be able somehow to curb mounting popular dissatisfaction as expressed in the growing strike movement, the increasingly militant trade unions and support for the Communists. When the workers return from their holidays, the newspaper Le Monde predicts, there will be hard times in store for the government.

Lev Makarevich

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U.S.S.R. – EGYPT

We have reached renewed understanding

A dialogue between two ambassadors

The Novosti Press Agency recently held a round-table discussion on the subject "Soviet-Egyptian relations: past and present," timed to coincide with the 45th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Present at the meeting were **SALAH BASSIOUNY,** Egyptian ambassador to the Soviet Union, and **GENNADY ZHURAVLEV,** Soviet ambassador to Egypt, who exchanged views on the subject under discussion.

Learning the lessons of history

Zhuravlev. Diplomatic relations between our countries were established in August 1943, when the stones of Stalingrad and the sands of Al-Alamayn had not cooled from the world conflagration. The growing prestige of the Soviet Union and the Egyptians' desire to rely on a powerful ally in the struggle against British domination gave an impetus to the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Bassiouny. Though formally relations were established in 1943, they began to acquire real content only after the July Revolution of 1952, and then not right away. It took the new leadership headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser three years to become completely disillusioned with the West's policy and turn to the Soviet Union in search of a reliable partner.

The flourishing of our relations began after the failure of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956. It was in the 1960s that the famous Aswan Dam was built with Soviet assistance and the basis of national industry laid. Thanks to Soviet arms deliveries and military expertise the country's defensive capacity increased substantially.

But then came a period of cooling in our relations. This happened both for objective and subjective reasons. Egypt's defeat in the 1967 war and the advent of Sadat to power also had an adverse effect on our relations. For some time after Nasser's death the high level of Soviet-Egyptian relations carried on under their own momentum. A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was concluded between the two countries in 1971. But, in my opinion, it did not match up to the objective processes in our relations and, therefore, did not prove viable.

Zhuravlev. I would like to take issue with my honourable colleague by reminding him that no one forced Egypt to conclude the treaty. Anwar Sadat did it on his own initiative.

Bassiouny. In any case, the deterioration in Soviet-Egyptian relations was an anomaly.

Zhuravlev. But even in the worst years the Soviet Union and Egypt never had differences that affected national interests. The history of our relations should be studied with the sole purpose of drawing correct conclusions from it and preventing a repetition of mistakes.

Obstacles removed

Zhuravlev. Examining the present state of relations between our countries, we can say with good reason that they are developing dynamically, and that understanding between our peoples is increasing. The visit of Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Ismat Abdel Maguid to Moscow indicated that the normalization of Soviet-Egyptian relations had been completed.

Bassiouny. Indeed, in Egyptian-Soviet relations there are now practically no obstacles that could hamper mutually advantageous contacts. In the spring of last year Cairo and Moscow reached an agreement on the settlement of complex

redit and financial issues related to military debts. As for the credits granted gypt, they have practically been paid ff.

Zhuravlev. This has made it possible o return to the practice of concluding ong-term trade and economic agreements. A protocol on trade turnover for 988–90 has come into force. It envisges a 50 per cent rise in the volume of ade between the two countries. An ageement on economic, trade, scientific nd technical cooperation was signed st May. A protocol on cultural, scientific nd technical cooperation over the next vo years is being drafted. The two sides re conducting talks connected with the stablishment of joint ventures and the construction, modernization and ex-

line with the Helsinki agreements.

Neither armed force nor separate deals

Bassiouny. For our part, we enthusiastically welcome the continuation of Soviet-American dialogue. We hope that the Soviet Union and the United States will be able to work out a common approach to the settlement of the Middle East crisis. Such a hope has been kindled by regular American-Soviet consultations on the Middle East.

Zhuravlev. The Soviet Union is making energetic efforts to achieve an early set-

international conference sould be convened. It must be held with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council and all parties concerned, in particular the Palestine Liberation Organization as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. We have no differences on this score.

What is preventing the holding of an international conference? The most serious obstacle is the position of Israel, which rejects the very idea of such a forum. Unfortunately, the U.S. position on this question is not consistent. Washington is still unable to make a final decision on the status of the conference and, like Israel, still refuses to have direct contacts with the PLO. We differ from

mal Abdel Nasser 918-1970), founder e leader of the Free icers' Movement, organization that ared and carried the anti-imvialist and antial revolution of y 23, 1952. Presit of Egypt since e 1956. A consis- champion of er friendship and der cooperation ween Egypt and the viet Union. He was arded the title of ro of the Soviet on.

Muhammad Anwar Sadat (1918-1981), President of Egypt since October 1970. Initiator of the separate "peace" treaty with Israel (1979) concluded under U.S. aegis. Denounced the bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation, expelled Soviet military advisers. Incidentally, New Times office in Cairo was also closed during his presidency. Killed in 1981.

Muhammad Hosni Mubarak (b. 1928). President of Egypt since October 1981. An advocate of a balanced foreing policy.

ansion of enterprises built with Soviet ssistance.

An end has been put to discrimination gainst Soviet organizations in Egypt. he consulate-general of the U.S.S.R. in exandria and consulate in Port Said ave resumed their work, and the Soviet ultural Centre in Cairo has reopened.

Bassiouny. The development of Egypn-Soviet relations has become possie largely thanks to the new political inking in international relations. The w thinking is helping establish ties beteen countries holding different views d pursuing independent national olicies

Zhuravlev. Establishing cooperation th Egypt or any other country, we take for granted that relations with third ates are their own sovereign affair. This so applies to Egyptian-American relans. As for the joint military exercises gularly conducted by Egypt and the ited States, we want them to be held ss frequently and to become more acssible to foreign observers, at least in measure practised in Europe in

tlement of the Middle East conflict. We believe that the vicious circle cannot be broken by separate uncoordinated efforts. I believe the improvement in Soviet-Egyptian relations is contributing to a Middle East settlement.

Bassiouny. Like the Soviet Union, Egypt believes that the Middle East conflict cannot and must not be resolved by armed force. As for the Camp David accords, I would like to recall that they consist of two parts. The first part concerns Egypt and Israel, and the second, the Middle East problem as a whole. Both parts are included in a framework giving a general idea of ways of reaching a settlement in the Middle East.

For three years we conducted negotiations with Israel in defence of the rights of the Palestinian people. But unfortunately the negotiations proved fruitless. For this reason we believe that the agreements concluded between us are now dead. Only one possibility remains – an international conference on the Middle East. We fully share the Soviet Union's view that an

the United States on this issue.

Zhuravlev. The Middle East problem cannot be solved by either armed force or separate deals. We are pressing insistently for the early holding of an international conference on the Middle East, using international forums and Soviet-American summit talks for this purpose. For a long time Washington did not recognize the Soviet Union's role in a Middle East settlement. The situation is now changing. Reaffirming the need to convene an international conference, the United States also agrees that the Soviet Union should participate equally in it.

The Soviet and Egyptian positions on this key issue are today close in many points. The existing differences can be overcome.

Recorded by

I. Menshikov

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

The space economy instead of SDI

Andrei Gudkov

"Now we know what the aftermath of a nuclear war will be," a scientist said. "But there is no telling what will happen to us if such a war never breaks out." The earth is slowly but surely moving towards an ecological catastrophe. But mankind is not altogether defenceless in the face of it.

Nevertheless, ecology does not rank first, or even second among the vital problems confronting mankind. In science and industrial production the main emphasis is on projects aimed at improving arms, especially nuclear missiles, and strategic space weapons are already on their way.

Why don't we choose butter?

While the gross world product approaches 15 trillion U.S. dollars, the world's total military spending has already topped one trillion. The yearning to survive and keep our planet green is in irreconcilable conflict with the arms race. This is not just a question of the political differences between the two social systems. It is common knowledge that the economic interests of the designers and manufacturers of modern weapons play a major role here. It is a mistake to presume that if politicians manage to agree on disarmament, the conversion of arms manufacture to civil production will become a strictly domestic affair of the states concerned. Such a simplistic view is shrugged off by experts: things are much more complicated than that. In a modern economy, it is not so easy to "beat swords into ploughshares."

There are many serious obstacles in the way of conversion. First of all, the munitions plants' production capacities, floating capital and technological potential are so great, as a rule, that their owners regard the well-intentioned offer to switch to civil business as an invitation to the elephant to climb into a mouse hole.

Second, the psychological aspect of the problem should not be dismissed either: it is hard for both the owners and employees of munitions plants to accept a policy of economic demilitarization. Those engaged in defence-related production have developed an awareness of their work's special social importance and patriotic character.

Third, big military industrial companies usually monopolize their respective spheres of production and face only limited competition. The fulfilment of orders involves minumum commercial risks. Arms manufacturers are entitled to all sorts of benefits – tax, crediting, commercial.

Conversion is the biggest problem for plants which, owing to the specific nature of their technology, have only a weak foothold in the civil market. The U.S. aerospace industry, for instance, is busy fulfilling federal defence orders, for the most part, which constitute 60-75 per cent of the total. In missile production, orders from federal defence agencies amount to a still higher proportion – 80-90 per cent. In the atomic industry and radionics the figures are 50-70 and 35-50 per cent, respectively. The reason the SDI programme appeals to American industry is that by promising to "rid" the world of nuclear weapons, it is fully in line, as regards its technological orientation, with the above-mentioned branches' traditional specializations.

Is conversion nonetheless a realistic proposition?

It could be, on condition, first, that it is conceived in such a way as to draw on the backlogs, and answer to the specialization of the aerospace industry. Consequently, the conversion project should be space-related, as the SDI programme



Even this awesome SDI contraption, looking like something straight out of a sci-fi novel, could be put to a much more rewarding use – say, as part of a space solar electric station, as suggested by the author of this article

s. The spheres that make profitable capital investments possible should take precedence over others. In order to make a conversion scheme more tempting, the expenses involved in carrying it out could be shared by several states, with surplus capital to be drawn from non-militarized industries. Projects that could contribute to the solution of mankind's global problems are certain to win public support. Along with the nuclear war danger, these are ecological and energy problems.

Constructive proposals for the conversion of arms production, in particular, the aerospace industry, are steadily coming to the forefront of scientists' minds worldwide. The astrophysicist Carl Sagan has come up with the idea of a Soviet-American expedition to the planet Mars. The setting up of a permanent manned observatory on the Moon is being considered.

SSES

Now is the time to recall another idea put forward in the sixties which seems to suggest a way of solving conversion problems. I mean the idea of putting a system of space solar electric stations (SSES) in geostationary orbits at the so-called Lagrange points. First put forward by Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, the idea is still supported by some modern scientists. Writing in the magazine The Futurist, John Platt, for instance, pointed out that manmade satellites beaming energy generated by solar batteries to the earth will keep mankind continually supplied with much more energy than it has ever used, without polluting the environment at all.

In the early seventies, the SSES idea was dropped for economic reasons. At a tentative estimate, energy obtained from space would be two to three times more expensive as that generated by nuclear power plants on earth. Fifteen years later, the Chernobyl disaster has detracted much from the appeal of the nuclear energy alternative. At the same time, the rapid progress being made in the space-related spheres of science and technology offers new possibilities for translating the SSES idea into reality.

Criticisms of the space energy concept can be reduced to three arguments:

– the cost of putting energy transmitting satellites in geostationary orbits is extremely high;

– crystal silicon solar batteries are not particularly efficient and are both difficult and costly to make;

– the technical problems connected with energy transmission from space to earth haven't yet been solved.

Recently, the U.S.S.R. Main Space Administration (Glavkosmos) has announced that the delivery of payloads to geostationary orbits will cost 10,000-15,000 dollars per kilo. Since building space electric stations will require tons rather than kilos of materials, it looks as if the economic obstacles in their way will remain. However, we now stand a chance of surmounting this obstacle as early as in the nineties. The 50 per cent cut in strategic nuclear arms now being negotiated by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. will make it possible to "strike off the active list" hundreds of powerful ground-based ballistic missiles. An agreement has been reached in Geneva to the effect that these missiles can be launched into space on peaceful missions. Specifically, these missiles could be instrumental in slashing the transportation expenses involved in implementing the space energy programme.

A "Chernobyl" in the sky?

A switchover from crystal silicon to amorphous silicon photocells has cut solar battery costs to a fraction. Japanese companies have promised to develop highly efficient and cheap amorphous silicon plastic-base photocells by 1990. Such cells will help reduce size of batteries and make their transportation into orbit less of a problem. Other design innovations are now being tested for efficiency. On board the Mir station, Soviet cosmonauts have recently put a gallium-arsenide photocell into action.

Various space beam-weapon systems are now being developed as part of the SDI programme. Scientists are of the opinion that directed laser and microwave energy transmission systems could be much more rewarding to mankind if used in space solar electric stations.

Notably, ground-based solar energy receiving stations have to be set up well away from population centres for reasons of ecological safety because beamed energy has great destructive power. However, the discovery, in 1987, of high-temperature (so-called "nitrogen") superconductivity promises success in solving the problem of reducing losses in energy transmitted from remote stations to users on earth and in space.

In his January 1988 message to Congress, President Reagan described the SDI progamme as the nation's insurance against "a Chernobyl in the sky," a means of prevention a nuclear catastrophe following an unsanctioned missile attack by, for example, an extremist grouping. Now SSES can be used to destroy single targets in space.

The kernel of the SSES idea is the conversion of SDI and, possibly, of counter-SDI. The industry catering to the SDI project will be geared to civil production. Tens of thousands of experts will find peaceful applications for their skills.

SSES-type objects should best be built and used as the joint property of mankind. They offer many countries a chance to contribute towards "star peace".

At the United Nations in 1985, the Soviet Union put forward the initiative On International Cooperation in Peaceful Exploration of Outer Space in the Conditions of Its Non-Militarization. This document suggests establishing a world space organization and embarking on a discussion of the principles and directions of international cooperation in space research. To my mind, the space economy is not only the optimum direction for space research; it offers a realistic solution to the conversion problem, as well as to problems of environmental pollution by ground and particularly nuclear power plants.

Drawing from U.S. News and World Report

■

A TIME TO THROW STONES AND

Leonid Medvedko,
D. Sc. (Hist.)

The Palestinian uprising, now in its eighth month, has come to be known in political parlance as "the war of stones." The stones hurled at the army of occupation remind the whole world that the time has come in this biblical land not only to throw stones but to collect them.

I paraphrase the famous words from the Bible with a purpose. In the Middle East today two diametrically opposed processes are at work: a confrontation between centrifugal and centripetal, destructive and constructive, forces. The Palestinians, risen in rebellion, are "hurling" stones in order to put an end to the occupation regime, and are "collecting stones" as building material for an Arab state of Palestine. Outdated confessional, theocratic and authoritarian structures are collapsing. This is happening both in Arab countries and in Israel itself. The "stones of hatred" are being cast at adversaries. But periodically the common enemies are forgotten and "stones of intolerance" are exchanged between yesterday's allies and even comrades-in-arms. They now divide zones of influence, now fight for power, now differ as regards tactics or strategy and accuse one another of betrayal. But as often as not, they are merely settling old clan or personal scores.

All this, naturally, impedes the "collecting" of stones. But nothing can stop the constructive process that has already begun in this strife-weary region from which the prophets of three religions have preached the ideas of peace, love and brotherhood.

David becomes a brutal Goliath

The perilous balancing between the abyss of war and the quagmire of occupation cannot go on indefinitely. This is perhaps the only point on which all participants in and observers of the stormy events in the Middle East are agreed. No one ventures to predict how things will develop, conceding at once that one possibility is as likely as another. Moreover, it is becoming ever harder to control events. All the attempts made to settle the conflict by brute force or by ingenious diplomatic manoeuvres, by additional supplies of arms or generous credits, by exhortation or by crude pressure have proved futile. Extremes, it is said, are bound to meet eventually. Here so far they have met only in ever new collisions. Impatience and intolerance have engendered endless wars. Patience, which in the Arab East is called "the key to happiness," has so far brought neither peace nor happiness. It, too, apears to be wearing thin. Where is the way out of this labyrinth?

Both soldiers and diplomats have come up only against blind alleys. Faith in the omnipotence of money has been undermined. The "oil weapon" resorted to time and again has not produced the desired results – it has turned out to be double-edged. Neither has any headway towards peace been made by the diverse proponents of terrorism. Individual, group or state – all these varieties of that universally condemned evil merely create a vicious circle. Immorality in geometrical progression engenders immorality. Violence breeds violence on a still greater scale. But in itself violence is sterile, as is sham peace if it is basically amoral.

It is precisely for this reason that the Camp David peace, nurtured by Washington, has now, ten years later, given up the ghost as the Americans themselves admit. Its Lebanese double, a sort of cross between Israeli-style war and American-style peace, proved stillborn.

Thus, the search for a balance of strength has led to something of a balance of impotence of both strategy and diplomacy.

Recall the maxim of the French thinker Jules Renard: "Time alone loses no time." But time does not of itself work either for Israel or for the Arabs, however hard both sides try to make it their ally. Too much of it has been lost by the militant generals and the self-confident peacemakers. They have bent every effort to compensate for loss of time by concerning themselves with "living space" and "secure frontiers." But that, too, has proved to be a chimera. As a result of all the wars, Israel has swallowed up more Arab land than it has been able to digest. As the Arab writer Atall ah Mansour, who lives in Israel, aptly put it, "instead of stepping on the snake that threatened them, they swallowed it. Now they have to live with it, or die from it." Perhaps that is why Israel, after all its "brilliant victories" and "remarkable achievements," gives the impression, according to Time magazine, of being "unhappy, agitated and exhausting", and its leadership, being in a state of stagnation, "taken by surprise by the Palestinian uprising, paralyzed by the dilemma of the territories." Paradoxically enough, the magazine concludes, with the physical expansion of Israel's territory, the country's moral prestige has fallen. The Israeli soldier shooting down unarmed teenagers no longer projects the image of the little David fighting the giant Goliath.

It is not for nothing that the unarmed uprising of the Palestinians is called the "stone revolution." It combines in a single current the spontaneous revolt of the new generation that has grown up under the occupation regime and the prolonged struggle for social justice waged by the fathers and elder brothers of that generation. They have merged in an organized movement not only of political but of religious protest by the majority of Palestinians against oppression, for their legitimate national rights.

Unquiet pause

The seeming pause in the Middle East settlement process has been accompanied by an increasing shift of emphasis in the struggle from the traditional governmental sphere to the popular, social level – a phenomenon characteristic of our time. This is evidenced not only by the "war of stones" but also by people's diplomacy, which is gaining ever greater momentum on the political arena.

Even the London International Institute

A TIME TO COLLECT THEM

A Palestinian detained by an Israeli patrol

or Strategic Studies, which ordinarily engaged in analyses of the comparative strength of armed forces in the world, notes in its latest survey the growing tendency towards the internationalization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinian revolt, the authors of the survey observe, came as a surprise both for the Israeli leaders and for some Arab states as well. It seemed like a bolt from the blue and was led in its initial stages by youths no one had ever heard of.

Whether that is the case or not I cannot say, but prior to the decision taken by the Algiers meeting of the leaders of Arab states to render it every assistance, the Palestinian uprising received both moral and material support mainly from public and not government sources. At any rate, judging by the talks at the Arab-Soviet meeting in Amman, my impression was that effective unity as regards the Palestinian uprising was patently lacking. Not just cooperation but even mutual understanding between the Arab patriotic organizations is only just beginning to take shape. There is still less understanding as regards relations with the progressive forces in Israel who are opposed to the brutal occupation regime. There is a marked lack of mutual tolerance both in Israel and in the Arab countries, especially in neighbouring states.

All this made itself felt also at the International Conference to Support the Popular Uprising in the Occupied Palestine, held recently in Benghazi. It was attended by delegations and guests from 60 countries representing about 200 different political parties and public organizations in all five continents. However, the absence of representatives of the peace movements of Israel, and more so of influential public organizations of Syria, Jordan and Iraq, could not but be noted with regret by many participants in this prestigious forum.

In his opening address at the conference, Abdel Salam Galloud, member of the revolutionary leadership of Libya, described the Palestinian revolt as "a revolution of an angry generation." The general tenor of the discussion and the resolutions adopted – the Final Declaration and the Programme of Action in Solidarity with the Palestinian Popular Uprising in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza – were convincing testimony to a growing understanding by all the participants of the interconnection and interdependence of developments in the modern world.

A sense of involvement in what is happening in Palestine pervaded the speeches of Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization of Namibia (SWAPO), who was a guest of honour, the Libyan Omar al-Hamdi, General Secretary of the Arab People's Congress, the Italian senator Milani Eliseo, the Egyptian general Kamal Haffis, as well as fighters for human rights, political, public and religious activists from the U.S., Canada, Latin America and Australia. The speakers stressed that in their countries few today would venture to call the Palestinian rebels "terrorists." More and more voices of protest are raised against the savage repressive measures taken by the Israeli occupation authorities who are accused of racism and genocide, as well as police and state terrorism.

The Arab word "intifadeh" (uprising) was used at the conference without translation into other languages. As the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat observed in a talk with members of the delegation from the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, "intifadeh" has become a component of the new political realities on the world arena.

Twenty years later

My meeting with Yasser Arafat in Benghazi took place 20 years after my first interview with him at the headquarters of Palestine command in the Jordan Valley in my capacity as Pravda special correspondent. That was late at night a few days after the first major battle between the Palestinians and the Israeli regular army near the town of Karameh. I reminded Arafat of the long discussion we had had about the forms and methods of liberation struggle against Israeli aggression. He had maintained then that the Palestine resistance was not simply a liberation but revolutionary movement, and hence it had the right to resort to any methods, giving preference, of course, to armed struggle and other forms of violence.

This time, not as a journalist but as a historian, I raised almost the same question with Arafat, asking him for a retrospective appraisal of the present stage in the Palestinian movement. I also wanted to know how correct it was to call the "intifadeh" a "stone revolution."

"I would describe the 'intifadeh' as a new stage of the Palestinian revolution," Arafat replied, "as its perestroika creating a fundamentally new situation not only on

the occupied Arab lands but for the Middle East settlement process as a whole. Yes, much has happened in the past 20 years and much blood has been shed." How much nearer had the Arab-Israeli wars brought a solution of the Palestinian problem, I asked. Arafat admitted that these wars had not moved the solution forward appreciably; on the contrary, they had sometimes had the opposite effect. "As regards the latest war in Lebanon, I agree with the view that it was mainly a war between Israel and the Palestinians, because the Palestinians there were supported only by the Lebanese patriots with limited assistance from the Syrians. The aggressor had no Arab coalition to contend with in Lebanon. We had to reconsider and reappraise many things after Lebanon."

"The most important thing," Arafat continued, "was that we realized that the fate of the Palestinian revolution must be decided on Palestinian soil and primarily by the Palestinians themselves. That is why we believe that the 'war of stones' can carry the Palestinian cause much farther forward than any of the previous wars. That is why we say that stones can prove stronger than aircraft, tanks and missiles. But, of course, we need international support and we are becoming increasingly aware of that support. How long can the uprising continue? As long as need be! At any rate, it can play the role of an additional lever not only for the convocation of an international conference on the Middle East but also for the achievement of its first positive results. Our strength lies in unity. The Arab summit in Algiers, although it did contribute to the revival of the common Arab front of struggle, was, regrettably, unable to overcome the many obstacles still impeding progress in this sphere."

When, on returning from Benghazi, I learned that the bloody clashes between the different Palestinian factions of Fath had recurred, I recalled Arafat's admission with some bitterness. Unfortunately, the obstacles have not been overcome, even within the most influential Palestinian organization which had been created and headed all these years by Yasser Arafat.

Winds and vectors

Mention of such internecine strife was carefully avoided at the conference. On the other hand, there was frank condemnation of the instances of repressive action taken against Palestinians and progressive Arab leaders by the official authorities of some Arab countries. The conference appealed to the governments of these countries to release political prisoners, primarily, Palestinians, and voiced full support for all Arab patriots fighting against the Zionist-imperialist presence on their soil.

However, the conference was not altogether free of political speculation, of attempts to denigrate the Soviet Union's policy aimed at opening the way to the solution of regional conflicts in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. This was manifest, among other things, in the overemotional speech by Pierre Krebs of the F.R.G. Formally a delegate from the Free University of Europe, he laid claim to speaking on behalf of all European intellectuals, urging the creation of an "Arab-European alliance of Mediterranean countries and peoples" to counter "Zionism, American neoglobalism and Soviet imperialism."

Of course, one can hardly expect positive movement forward not to be accompanied by relapses into the old political thinking. One of the Libyan delegates, for instance, expressed doubts as to the possibility of any approximation of the positions of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. on the Middle East issue so long as the Palestinian uprising continued. A delegate from Tunisia on the same plea went so far as to deny the Soviet Union the right to enter into any political contact with Israel – which was tantamount to retarding the Middle East settlement process and limiting the political openings for supporting the righteous cause of the Palestinians. I could not help thinking that obstructionist forces make themselves felt not only in our internal perestroika but in the restructuring of international life as well. And so we must learn to take for granted heated debates and conflict of opinions both in the one and the other spheres.

The new political thinking is slowly but surely forging ahead on global and regional levels. Progress has been registered even in some of the most difficult and explosive areas. There are encouraging signs of an end to the war between Iran and Iraq, the longest since World War II. And now, evidently, it is the turn of the most protracted conflict in the Middle East. The strengthening of international solidarity with the Palestinian struggle is an important step forward. But no less important is it to cement the ranks of the supporters of that struggle. What is needed is unity of action, not just of declarations. Things are changing. But it must be borne in mind that the changes are taking place at opposite poles, in the direction of both common sense and extremism.

Meanwhile more zeal is displayed in throwing stones than in collecting them for constructive purposes. But while in the Arab ranks there is a growing tendency towards a collective search for a political solution of the conflict, continued calls for "more resolute action" are heard from Israel. These calls have begun to sound still louder since the first signs of a possibility of terminating the Iran-Iraq war appeared.

I am afraid that even the convocation of an international conference on the Middle East will not untangle the knot if the sides, pulling in opposite directions, will tighten that knot instead of untying it.

We are more accustomed to facing head winds and relying too much on favourable currents. But in the Middle East, in the stormy seas of passions, amid visible and invisible reefs of political and economic interests and national and religious ambitions, it is obviously a mistake to ignore – as we have so often done in the past – the many crosscurrents and side winds, to be encountered . For it is the vectors involved that add up to the resultant of any movement and process. There is no Ariadne's thread to wait for. In the final analysis, it is only by taking all these factors into account that the way out of the Middle East labyrinth will be found.

AMMAN-TRIPOLI-BENGHAZI-MOSCOW

Stones against automatic rifles

Reproduced from the magazine Filistine Al-Thawra

A CONTRIBUTION FROM WORLD PAPER

World Paper
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世界新聞

March
1988

World Paper

What do journalists in different countries think about many of the problems that worry all of us? An exchange of information will help us to gain a better understanding of each other. This is precisely what the Boston newspaper World Paper does by offering its articles for publication to newspapers and magazines. We are going to acquaint New Times readers periodically with its material. The articles below are reprinted from a recent issue of the World Paper, and consider what the world could be like in ten years' time.

Wiring the world is easier than understanding it

Four centuries passed between the printing of the Mazarin Bible in 1455 on Johann Gutenberg's press and that day in 1844 that Samuel F.B. Morse startled the U.S. Congress by transmitting the message, "What hath God wrought?", by telegraph between Baltimore and Washington.

Both events bracket the first communications revolution that only gradually shrunk the world. The printing press, then the telegraph led the way.

The telephone followed in 1876, then movies and radio early in the 20th century, then television in time to reshape the post-World War II world, then audio and video cassettes and computers.

Now we communicate in space with satellites providing the platforms from which human beings and nation states instantaneously reach audiences in every corner of the globe.

No one is startled when a late-night Nightline programme in the United States or similar programmes anywhere else link sworn enemies – an Israeli prime minister or an Arab prince.

The programme illustrates the vast changes in the way we communicate within and across national borders. In a startling leap over man-made and natural barriers, the technological advance simply has obliterated obstacles that philosophers and historians once regarded as immutable as well as immovable.

It is part of a new communications revolution-linking people and communities by ever more rapid and complex means – that is the fundamental revolution of the modern era.

It should be obvious that the expansion of the means and speed of communication does not lead to a world in which we communicate better. Having the capacity and using it well do not go hand-in-glove.

To discover on television that an adversary like Mikhail Gorbachev has a human face does not necessarily make his wary audience more receptive to his ideology.

Over the next 10 years, no technical obstacle will exist to "wiring" the entire world. With the end of the need to lay cable, with an expanding network of communication satellites, with miniaturization of cameras and relay equipment already permitting live television transmission from the battlefield, technology will allow anyone, anywhere, to be in touch with people and information from virtually anywhere, anytime.

Prophets tend to speak in almost religious terms of this dawning new age. They say humanity need no longer be saddled by ignorance.

They say the information that has been the traditional preserve of the mandarins and other intellectuals will become humanity's common pursuit.

As the prophets see the future, the electronic transfer systems which can handle the movement of 200 billion dollars a day across useless national borders are put a pale intimation of the border-busting possibilities of a new communications revolution far from exhausting its potential.

The prospect is fabulous, but unlikely. Little proof exists for the proposition that the more we know each other, the more we like one another and the more we tend to become like one another.

It's no coincidence that in an age of unparalleled communication capability, our contemporary limited wars are often within the family, from insurgents in the Philippines to the Irish in Northern Ireland.

The history of past breakthroughs in communications is instructive. So is even a small understanding of the way most governments react protectively to threats to their pre-eminence in the field of information transmission and retrieval.

Reacting to the use of a private French satellite to conduct image-sensing over the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union, the U.S. Defence Department has backed legislation restricting the use of satellite image sensing.

Reacting to the reality that it cannot stop transmission of images from the rock-throwing confrontations of the West Bank, the Israel government simply bars the area to television cameras. Or Iran invites battlefield coverage only when it suits its purpose.

For seven years, the Reagan administration has restricted the export of computer equipment to the Soviet Union and its East European allies, although the effort is like using two fingers to stem a 20-hole dyke.

Even the most open and democratic society is sensitive to the communication of information that is important to national security.

Governments in the West are as busy as those in the Communist East or in the Third World trying to hem information into tidy, carefully controlled packets.

Communictions can even be provocative. Advances in communications can be tracked precisely to the extent religious fundamentalists have been brought into jarring contact with the modern world.

Censorship has grown as communications have multiplied. The Roman Catholic Index of books troubled only a small circle for centuries. But when a television viewer in the Lynchburg, Virginia, countryside inhabited by the Rev. Jerry Falwell, sees on his tube the burning of flags or the emergence from the closet of a homosexual society, there is apt to be fear, suspicion, rage and rejection.

Fundamentalism also has used communications, from the radio and television ministries of Jimmy Swaggart and Pat Robertson to the smuggled cassettes on which the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini helped undermine the shah during the religious leader's exile in Paris. Terrorist kidnappers have grown adept at using hand-held video cameras to produce tapes to deliver the messages of their hostages.

Having access to information is not going to alter the paranoia of a Russian shaped for centuries not by ideology but by a history of his land being crisscrossed by invaders. Being neighbours did not prevent Germany and France from engaging in a century of war. It takes more than proximity, geographical or communicative, to breed real communication and understanding.

The new communications revolution will lead to cultural cross-pollination on a vastly larger scale. The world seems to have an endless appetite for the worst that the shlock television and movie factories of the United States can produce. Even insular America has developed a taste for the entertainment offerings of others.

With cross-pollination also will come propaganda cross-pollution on a grander scale, as great and small powers bombard the world with endless hours of communication.

More and faster is not necessarily going to be better. The prospect for the year 2000 is for a communication on a grand new scale, but real communication at a more conventionally human level.

Hodding CARTER
assistant secretary
of state for
public affairs
in 1977-1980
WASHINGTON, U.S.

Will anyone notice when the new millennium comes?



The next 10 years bring us closer not only to the beginning of a new century but the start of a new millennium, an event the world witnesses but once every 1,000 years. For many, the starting date for both will be January 1, 2000, although purists will insist the new era actually begins a year later, insomuch as the first century's final year was 100 AD and subsequent centuries began the next Year One.

Otherwise, either year is nothing but a benchmark in the Augustan calendar, a man-made time measuring device of the daily, weekly, monthly and yearly journeys of the moon and earth. No cosmic or astronomical significance rides with the beginning of a new century or millennium. Those who mark the birth of Jesus Christ from the Year 1 AD probably have a hard time with the calculations of such scholars as Italian Marcello Craveri. In his "Life of Christ," he offers evidence that Jesus actually was born seven years before the start of the new century when Joseph and Mary trekked to their birthplace, Bethlehem, for the Roman census.

The year 2000 serves as a measure of how far the world has come and has yet to go.

The international community, for example, gathered in 1979 at a mammoth World Health Organization-United Na-

tions Children's Fund conference in Alma-Ata, the Soviet Union, to swear a mighty vow that by the year 2000 there would be "health for all."

In the nearly 10 years that has elapsed we have become convinced that all we can be sure of is new diseases for all by 2000 – including AIDS and Herpes II, both unknown at Alma-Ata.

Presidents and prime ministers, economists and statisticians, novelists and poets, astrologers and their modern cousins, the futurologists, still harp on 2000 as a new age, dawn, horizon rising out of the old.

The millennium may bring us only fresh versions of the paradoxes of our age.

Our century advanced science and technology faster and with more impact on human life than all the rest of history. We bounded ahead in the science of vaccination and in the development of antibiotic magic bullets. We also produced the atom bomb.

We mass produced consumer goods – automobiles, frozen foods and plastics – and polluted our soil, water and air.

We used the television set and the computer to communicate and process information faster than ever imagined. But we did not improve the way we used information that often served to reinforce old stereotypes.

The Bolshevik revolution liberated the Russian peasantry and urban proletariat from tsarist rule, then crushed their euphoria under a heavy bureaucracy that controlled people's lives. Only in the new century will it be possible to measure the impact of perestroika and glasnost.

Women gained the right to vote but, despite being a majority in numbers, they remain a minority in economic and political power.

The colonized majorities of the world won political independence, but billions remain as destitute as ever.

The year 2000 also will bring us about one billion more people, even if all the family planning programmes in existence are 100 per cent successful.

The question then becomes how to reorder the world in the next decade to



accommodate these new arrivals to prevent them from joining the destitute. The United Nations has estimated that an additional 20 billion dollars a year over the decade will provide homes, water education, health services, more food and transport. But to a world spending 1,5 trillion dollars annually on arms, the figure for additional aid seems impossible.

That means a shift in a decade in values from reliance on aggression to solve disputes to cooperation to allocate the earth's resources more equitably.

Unless change occurs, the new century and millennium will be more of the same. The year 2000 will come and go – and no one will be able to tell the difference.

Tarzie VITTACHI
BANGKOK, THAILAND

■

SPACE

Fledgling cosmonauts

An international Soviet-Afghan crew lifted off from the Baikonur cosmodrome on August 29. Abdul Ahad Mohmand is the first cosmonaut from Afghanistan.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan still lacks the scientific and industrial potential required for embarking on a space programme of its own. Therefore the flight in question has largely been undertaken for propaganda purposes. Joint work on a round-the-earth orbit – space survey of mineral resources, in particular – is to give an impetus to the progress of the Republic's national economy and science.

The Soviet-Afghan crew is to carry out six experiments in space medicine as part of research into cosmonauts' work capacity, factors of adaptation to zero gravity, and the physiological and psychological responses of the organism.

Why is the Soviet space research programme putting such emphasis on medical investigations? Cosmonaut Anatoly Levchenko, who was with Titov and Manarov on their space mission as recenthy as last December, died in August. He was killed by a brain tumour. Did his stay in orbit accelerate the otherwise latent process? Doctors



say that while in space Anatoly Levchenko underwent much less stress than he had done as a test pilot.

The first crew is made up of Vladimir Lyakhov, Valery Polyakov and Abdul Ahad Mohmand, and the second crew of Anatoly Berezovoi, Gherman Arzamazov and Muhammad Dauran. The commander pilots – Colonel Vladimir Lyakhov (with two long-time flights totalling 325 days to his credit) and Colonel Anatoly Berezovoi (who has logged 211 days in orbit, a flight duration record at the time) hardly need to be introduced. Medical researchers Valery Polyakov and Gherman Arzamazov have much in common: both are graduates of Moscow's First Medical Institute, Candidates of Science, and both work at the Institute of Medico-Biological Problems (a space medicine centre).

Life has not been a bed of roses for the Afghan cosmonauts. Colonel Dauran's father, two brothers and uncle died at the hands of counterrevolutionaries; Captain Mohmand's family also sustained heavy losses. Boris Volyvanov, the commander of the cosmonauts' unit, said his new trainees smiled for the first time when their families arrived in Star Town.

Muhammad Dauran and Abdul Ahad Mohmand received their military training in the U.S.S.R., first graduating from an airmen's school and subsequenthy from the Air Force Academy. Both pilots speak perfect Russian, which obviated the need for them to go through the long preparatory course the participants in previous international space missions had to complete. Getting ready for the flight took them an unprecedently short time – since February, the month of their arrival in Star Town, till August.

Sergei LESKOV

American Indians today

Vladimir Razuvayev

We all played at cowboys and Indians in childhood and we have all seen the "Westerns" recreated by successive generations of children dressed up as Redskins and their pale-faced adversaries. In some countries the sympathies of the children are on the side of the indomitable and belligerent Indian warriors, and in others, on the side of the blue-uniformed troops but, be that as it may, American Indians became part of our childhood and culture a long time ago. The protagonists of the games played by children are modelled on film stars and literary characters, however, and bear little resemblance to the real-life parties to the contact between the two worlds.

Why can't they be like us?

The history of the relationship between whites and Red Indians has seen times of profound mutual respect and times of blatant domination of the indigenous American community by the federal U.S. government. The discriminatory policies of the U.S. government in the latter half of the 19th century decimated the Indian population, and at one time the signs were that no trace would remain of the Indian problem, because there would be no Indians left. White public opinion in the United States viewed the indigenous inhabitants of the continent as savages and drunkards incapable of partaking of the benefits of civilization.

All this is now water under the bridge, but painful memories linger on. In the early decades of this century the Indian population began to stabilize, and later, to grow. Between 1950 and 1970 the Indian population doubled to reach 800 thousand. Ten years later it had reached 1.4 million, according to the latest U.S. census. Whatever their living standards may be, the Indians are no longer considered a people nearing extinction. In ethnographic terms they do not form a single people at all, as there are 173 indigenous Amerindian ethnic groups.

White America has changed too. At first it grew more tolerant of the Indians and then became more liberal, and even well-meaning towards them within reasonable limits. The good feelings on the part of the white community are confined, however, to areas where there are no major reservations or communities of indigenous Americans. According to the U.S. ethnographer and sociologist Thomas McElwain, hostility towards the Indians in areas bordering on reservations runs at a hundred per cent. The ill feeling becomes more intense in times of economic troubles. It weakens with signs of an economic boom. The indications are that the whites still view the Indians as rivals.

In spite of the fact that the average American may have little or no idea of what is really going on (some Americans believe that Indians are not allowed to leave their reservations) and that racial prejudice runs deep in some parts of the country, public opinion on the whole views Indians as equal citizens of the United States.

Given all the shortcomings of government policy, and there are many, the federal administration is paying a great deal of attention to the needs of the Indians, and Congressional debates on their problems have every appearance of being constructive discussions. Two things seem to rub the white Americans the wrong way. Educated in terms of the notion of a "melting pot," white Americans rather resent the ethnic identity of the Indians. They believe that since the Indians are just like everyone else, they too should "melt" into U.S. society. Some people maintain the view, however, that Indian culture is a national American asset that must be preserved. Moreover, the average American has grown used to considering income a measure of success and significance, and the Indians are clearly not in the moneyed groups of the population.

The two crucial aspects of the "Indian problem" are the preservation of the Indians' ethnic identity and the poverty rampant among them.

Indian or American?

There was a time when the Indians were under pressure to become assimilated and institutionalized in "civilized society." Far from all the measures taken by administration can be described as gentlemanly, but the indigenous Americans persevered. Moreover, they have learned to live in an ambience of constant cultural pressure.

Paradoxical as it may seem, one of the basic reasons for their stubborn resistance stems from government policy itself, for, on the one hand, it sought to destroy tribal and community institutions, having, for instance, done away with community land ownership in the 19th century, and, on the other, it rallied the Indians closer together around these institutions. The U.S. administration concluded treaties with the Indian tribes, and these treaties are still valid today. Under them, the U.S. government pledged to extend various kinds of assistance to the Indians. Not all of the terms of the treaties have been honoured by U.S. government, but living in reservations does guarantee the Indians a subsistence living standard and some social services. That is why many people are reluctant to break off ties with their tribe, and until the U.S. government began to provide material incentives to those wishing to live in the cities, practically the entire native population of the country was concentrated in traditional tribal areas.

The viability of Indian institutions also stems from their rather amazing ability to coexist with Western political culture, a rare situation for traditional patterns in society. A measure of borrowing has taken place, however. For instance ,tribal councils are now modelled on American democracy, but that appears to be a natural process and even an expedient one in the circumstances. Of late the English language has become the dominant one among the Indians, and with many of them it is the language used in the home. The Indians themselves maintain various attitudes to this and there is a traditionalist movement active among them for a return to ancestoral values.

The process of acquiring a sense of social identity is gathering momentum. This is an unexpected spin-off of the growing migration of Indians to the cities, where about 45 per cent of Indians now reside. The trend towards emphasizing Pan-Indian identity at the expense of the bygone tribal mentality is confined to Indians who have moved to big cities. The situation in small towns near reservations is exactly the opposite: the Indians are rapidly shedding their identity and cultural traditions. This is explained by the fact that in order to get on in life in a closely knit community they have to be like everyone else. The new element in the political behavior of indigenous Americans is that urban Indian leaders are trying to establish contacts and mutual understanding not only between various Indian groups, but also with various other ethnic minorities in the U.S. To date the Seminole War has been perhaps the only instance of a joint struggle of Indians and Afro-Americans against the "white man's America." That trend may hold the key to the future, although it is not widely supported on the reservations.

The structure and fundamentals of Indian identity are therefore gradually changing, although its contents are still directed against integration into society. That attitude does not mean, however, that Indians have no awareness of themselves as Americans or that they are unpatriotic. Their system of values is different from the conventional one. The money-making motive is, for instance, confined to relatively few urban Indians, and the same goes for the ethic of individualism. Children hold the same political principles as their fathers and forefathers. According to the U.S. scholar Margaret Murdoch, Indian teenagers, unlike their white counterparts, are politically oriented towards tribal authorities rather than the federal government run by the whites.

Economy and ethnos

The Indians are waging a struggle for their ethnic identity in the United States today according to the ground rules of the "white man's America." It is only natural therefore that their opponents have an advantage. For instance, the Sioux tribes have now long been engaged in a legal dispute with

the Government over the Black Hills, a range of low hills and canyons in South Dakota. The Wall Street Journal commented that few whites understand the strong religious traditions of the Indians, their mystic feelings for the ancestors and nature where the Black Hills are the heart of everything. In their turn, just as few Indians care much for the white-oriented tourist industry of the Black Hills which brings in 600 million dollars a year in profit.

Of late the living standards of tribal Indians in areas where oil, gas, and various mineral deposits have been found have improved. There was a time when the Indians were allocated the least promising areas, according to 19th-century estimates, that is, but it has since transpired that about 90 per cent of uranium deposits, 30 per cent of the nation's coal and 50 per cent of its energy resources are to be found there. Since the Indians could not develop that natural wealth themselves, they have had to lease their lands to major corporations. The reservations in the west of the country are not rich in minerals, but they have water to sell to mining companies and farms. Very few reservations have commercial natural resources, but the luckiest tribes are paid hundreds of millions of dollars every year for the use of their resources. The money they get is spent on social needs.

Of late the Indians have developed a taste for enterprise and are now earning more money, having taken up the options open to them. Gambling is big business in a number of reservations. The matter was brought before a special hearing in 1985 in the Select Committee on Indian Affairs at the U.S. Senate. The Indians make quite a lot of money from tourists visiting reservations, but sometimes they also take up a trade that becomes a tribal profession. For instance, the Iroquois Indians are acclaimed for their skills in putting up highrise buildings.

There has been a change for the better in the position of Indians. The mortality rate has perceptibly declined recently and educational standards have improved, approaching the national average in terms of the time spent at school, 9.8 and 12 years, respectively. Urban Indians are indistinguishable from other Americans in this sphere. On the whole, however, the Indians remain one of the most "underprivileged" ethnic groups in the United States.

Their average family annual incomes run at a quarter of the national average and the rate of unemployment among them is five times higher. Their life expectancy is five years shorter than the national average. The rent they are paid for their natural resources is a fraction of the profits made by the corporations. Most people living in reservations cannot attain a decent standard of living and stand no chance of doing so in the foreseeable future. A House of Representatives hearing quoted the following figures: the incidence of alcoholism among Indians is seven times higher than the national average. In South Dakota 89 per cent of all Indians taken into custody are drunk.

The low living standards on the reservations stimulate migration to the cities, where the Indians as a rule lose their ethnic identity. Perhaps that is how the U.S. authorities ultimately want to resolve the "Indian problem."

Laws are not like piecrusts

From slogans to reality

Is there any point in a division of power if the Party Secretary is at the same time Chairman of the Soviet? Why isn't the principle of the citizen's constitutional equality in the eyes of the law and the court still not observed? Is everything that the law does not forbid in fact permitted? New Times presents a further article in its series on the socialist, law-governed state, which we publish under the editorship of Professor Valery Savitsky, Dr. Sc. (Law)

Drawing by Konstantin Yarikov

Professor Savitsky is interviewed below by New Times observer Lev Yelin.

In its resolution, the 19th Party Conference declared that it was essential to ensure full power to the Soviets and distinguish clearly between the functions of Party and government bodies. This reform has matured and the need for it seems obvious to everyone. But one is assailed by doubts as to the real possibility of such an about-turn in a society in which the attitude to the Soviets as occupying a secondary place has been cultivated for decades.

This, in effect, lies at the pivot of the reform of our political system. What are we to do to ensure that the immense power concentrated until now in the hands of the Party is rationally redistributed? How is the Party to renounce a part of this power, and, especially, that part that is wholly associated with economic processes, in favour of the Soviets? To achieve this, it is essential, as I see it, for the substance of the conference statement to be given the force of law. Operative legislation to define the jurisdiction, powers, and organization of the Soviets must be revised, so that the law explicitly lays down in every detail the principles set out in the conference's decisions. We want the Soviets to be bodies with complete power to budget and finance their own self-governing operations in such a way as to be able to coordinate their own regional interests with the concerns of the state as a whole. Though on paper the Soviets were formerly seen as bodies wielding real power, in fact absolute power in a given area was held by the relevant Party committees.

Valery Savitsky
is a department head, the Institute of State and Law of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences

In line with the decisions of the conference, the People's Deputies are to hold annual conventions, which will be the country's supreme bodies of power. Yet Party forums such as plenums, conferences and congresses remain. We are accustomed to expecting them to take the key decisions, as is appositely illustrated by the 19th Party Conference. What will now set the guidelines for us?

The conventions of Soviets are a new form of people's power revived from Lenin's time. They will deal with extremely important and complex political and socio-economic issues. It will naturally be necessary to circumscribe their powers even with regard to the issues Communist Party congresses take up. That is quite possible, as we shall now be reducing the area of jurisdiction of the Party bodies, and abandoning the former situation in which the Party's influence encompasses every aspect of economic and social life.

What do you think of the proposal for the first secretary of a Party committee to be chairman of the Soviet of People's Deputies as well?

The Theses did not mention that proposal, which was first put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in his report. It caused controversy at the conference. No doubt there is food for thought here. The resolution says that the role of the representative bodies of power would be enhanced were the first secretaries of the respective Party committees to be recommended, **as a rule,** as candidates for chairmanship of the Soviets. We know that every rule has its exception. However in the case in question there is the danger that this rule could become one with no exceptions, in which case we shall be backtracking on some of the principles that we have enunciated. If the first secretary is elected chairman of the Soviet of People's Deputies, that will first of all remove the option of selecting the said chairman from amongst several candidates. Then there

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will be no competition. In the second place, non-Party people will never be elected chairmen of Soviets. Thirdly, though it is envisaged that the candidate elected first secretary at the plenum of the district Party committee will also be elected by secret ballot at the session of the respective Soviet, this will presumably mean one more additional screening. Yet we must take sober stock of the conditions in a given district or region. Normally the plenum of the district or regional Party committee will be made up of the same persons who are elected to the Soviets, that is, factory managers, farm chairmen and front-rank workers. As a result, that second screening that we have mentioned will have gone, since the same people who voted for the first secretary of the district or regional Party committee will vote for the chairman of the district or regional Soviet.

The conference aired the very reasonable idea that having a district Party committee secretary also discharging the functions of chairman of the district Soviet could defeat the object, which is the redistribution of power, the Party's renunciation of the administration of economic matters and public services. I find it very hard to imagine how power can be divided when concentrated in the hands of one person.

The conference resolution mentions certain civil rights, specifically the right to participate in government, the right of the individual to state his view on any subject, and freedom of conscience. The law must reliably safeguard the citizen's personal dignity, the inviolability of his home and the privacy of correspondence and telephone conversations. As I read that, I thought to myself that all this is recorded in our Fundamental Law, the Constitution, and has all been declared time and again from lofty rostrums. However, now it seems a revelation of the bold programme of perestroika!

The point is that to our regret there are still not enough effective safeguards – not merely on paper – for the Soviet citizen fully to implement his rights as an individual. The last three years, it is true, have seen more done than over the preceding 30-40, especially with regard to the freedom to express one's views, the freedom to hold street processions and demonstrations, and freedom of conscience. Nevertheless, the rights of the individual in this country are still not ensured by a system of genuine fundamental safeguards. We still do not have the tools whereby the citizen can exercise these rights. In this respect I think it is simply essential to address ourselves to the experience of certain bourgeois countries with classic democratic systems. For however much we vilify "their" democracy, however much we may say that it serves the interests of the ruling classes, in the West the individual often enjoys safeguards, legal included, which the citizen of the Soviet Union for the moment does not. Lenin urged us to take from abroad all that is of value, to take everything good from abroad with both hands: Soviet power plus the Prussian railway system, plus American technology and organization of trusts, plus American public education, etc., equal socialism. In 1934 Ordzhonikidze urged making the Soviet court similar to a British law court in the swiftness with which it expedites the legal process. I have already had occasion to note in New Times Britain's famous Habeas Corpus Act which entitles anyone apprehended to come before a law court within three days of detention and secure release on bail. Why shouldn't we introduce a similar measure?



These booklets, distributed in Britain free of charge, explain what legal aid a person can receive when detained by police, when the division of property is considered, and in other cases.

One more procedure merits attention. It is well known that many abuses during criminial investigation are due to the massive interrogation that the arrested or detained person is immediately subjected to, as a result of which, not infrequently, he may confess to a crime that he did not commit or give evidence he would have never given in normal conditions. It is extremely important for the arrested or detained person to have his lawyer with him during these very first hours and days so that he can have competent legal assistance. In this country at present a lawyer is allowed in most criminal cases only after the interrogation is over, for which reason the entire preliminary inquiry is conducted both juridically and in practice without a lawyer present.

In the U.K. the process is different. Any person whom the police detain is handed a special notice to detained persons defining his rights. Even before this is done, the arresting officer must also explain that the detained person is entitled immediately to inform anyone he deems necessary of his detention, ask for legal advice and have the opportunity to read the police Codes of Practice, which says what the police may and may not do. The detained person may request legal advice either in person, in writing, or by telephone. I think it would be advisable and expedient for our judiciary to adopt this procedure.

Talking of the U.K., we should certainly draw attention to the high standing of the law courts there. For us this is a very urgent matter.

The conference made a special point of stressing the need to enhance the legality of the courts within the system of socialist democracy. We must give practical form to such democratic and humanitarian principles in the judiciary as openness, the presumption of innocence, and equality between prosecution and defence. In the U.K. judges are appointed by the Queen or the Lord Chancellor in Her Majesty's name, and are appointed for life, or rather, till retiring age. When we discussed the problem of ensuring that the law courts are independent with British jurists, they often did not know what we were talking about, as in the U.K. the problem is simply nonexistent. The appropriate democratic institutions have been so finely honed over the centuries that it would never enter the heads of the powers that be to encroach upon the independence of judges. I think that this way of building up a body of judges by having the supreme authority appoint judges for life would create the most effective guarantees of genuine independence.

Perhaps initially, while the standards and professionalism of judges leave something to be desired, they should be elected by the Soviets of People's Deputies of higher instance, which is what the conference resolution specifies. That is, however, better than the current procedure, whereby people's judges are "elected" directlyby the population, while members of city, regional, territorial and other courts are elected at sessions

of Soviets at the same level. But that, let me repeat, would be only to begin with. Subsequently, provided we really want to have an independent, autonomous law court, we shall inevitably have to introduce the institution of appointment for life.

It would seem to me that what you have just said conflicts with all of the foregoing, more specifically your point about restricting the terms of office of one or other functionary.

I have heard that before. However, you fail to realize the uniqueness of a judge's functions. The office of judge is the only one in the state machine that is specially designated to arbitrate. A judge exercises power, but it is strictly circumscribed by the law. A judge cannot impose a sentence that is greater or less than is provided for by the respective article in the criminal code. He cannot pass a sentence for commission or omission that the criminal code does not specify. He is of course independent, but only within the framework of the law. Judicial procedure is designated down to the minutest detail. It offers no loopholes at all for the emergence of a cult, even a mini-cult. By virtue of the judge's unique office, it is essential that he be appointed not elected, insofar as election and the possibility of recall compromise the judge's independence and prevent his ruling in a case in line with his convictions and conscience, in full accordance with the law. No wonder that in most foreign countries judges are appointed, whereas the body of power, the parliament, or city or town council, is elected.

Recent critical comment has more than once included the point that in the U.S.S.R. the equality of citizens before the law and the courts is still far from always guaranteed. Is that true?

That's true enough. Due to the imperfect character of our judicial system, the constitutional principle in question is not fully observed. Thus, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the U.S.S.R. ratified in 1973, says: "Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law." Our laws, more specifically article 44 of the Fundamentals of Criminal Jurisprudence, also grant a convicted person the right of appeal to a court of higher instance. However this same article stipulates that "sentences passed by the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. and the Supreme Courts of the union republics are not subject to appeal or protest by way of cassation." Consequently, all those convicted by the Supreme Courts of the union republics, 3,000 or so people annually, find themselves in an unequal or rather worse situation than those sentenced by district or regional courts who, consequently, have the right of appeal. Yet a Supreme Court can sentence to death.

This injustice is exacerbated by the fact that in those union republics that have no regional divisions, such as Armenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Moldavia, their Supreme Courts examine cases of crimes which in the other republics come within the jurisdiction of the regional or territorial law courts. Thus, a person convicted by, for instance, the Rostov regional court for premeditated murder may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, but a person convicted for the same crime by the Lithuanian Supreme Court has no right of appeal.

Would this mean that a Soviet citizen has more or fewer rights depending on which union republic he resides in? Does it mean that a violation of the principles of equality before law of the Constitution is inherent in the judicial system itself and in the law that regulates that system? Can a law depriving a convicted person of his last hope be just anf fair?

This matter has been raised time and again, and has even been the subject of theses for academic degrees. However, the authorities upon whom the matter depends have not lifted a finger. The only alternative is, I think, to allow citizens convicted by union republic Supreme Courts to appeal to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court.

The conference resolutions tell us that the principle of permitting everything that is not forbidden by the law should be consistently implemented. Only recently, that provoked a furious resistance from the "prohibiting" instances. I think many offices will continue to react negatively, and that officials sticking to the "on no account" principle will follow the simple tried and tested method of applying numerous ordinances, the content of which will be "not for the public," in cases where no infringement of the law has been committed, and that much of what is "permitted" would turn out to be "prohibited."

First of all, I would like to clarify the extremely democratic principle that "everything that the law does not prohibit is permitted." It does not have absolute status and refers in particular to citizens and their economic, professional and other associations. They may indeed do everything that is not prohibited. However, this principle must not and should not apply to state executives and bodies of power. If they were to do everything that is not prohibited it would be tantamount to legalizing arbitrary practice and lawlessness. With respect to bodies of power, the opposite principle should apply. Here everything should be prohibited that the law does not specifically permit. What I mean is that if the law does not specifically allow bodies of power to act in a given way, then they cannot act in this way as it is not permitted and is therefore implicitly prohibited.

As for the prerogative arrogated by ministries and departments to issue ordinances that prohibit in practice what the law does not forbid, I regret to say that this still exists and that there are more than enough examples of it. This is because we do not have an effectively operating body of constitutional direction that would specifically see to it that departmental ordinances do not clash with the law. I personally thought the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court would best discharge this function. However, the Party conference decided to institute a special body, the Committee of Constitutional Direction. This decision has its good points. What is important is for the law to define precisely this body's obligations and duties, more specifically to answer queries from the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Procurator-General, ministers and also ordinary citizens, which is, I think, absolutely necessary. It is not enough merely to institute a body: it is essential to work out a whole machinery for implementing and exercising constitutional direction down to the last detail.

In conclusion I would like to make a special point of stressing the imperative that the conference resolution imposes to restructure the system of the population's legal education, and organize such a system as a single, uniform programme for the entire state and the entire Party. It seems strange that not even all judges have the legal codes to hand and often have to call on each other to find something needed in one or other code. I brought back from the U.K. a whole series of well-got-up booklets, which are distributed free. Just two or thee handsomely printed pages tell you what kind of legal aid the citizen can obtain from a lawyer in the event of his detention by the authorities, or in the event of the need to draft a will, divide property or start a venture of his own. It would be a good thing if we could put out something of the kind. Then it would be a good idea if, on entering upon his duties in court, each lay assessor were issued with a pocket-sized booklet of ten pages or so, and no more, which would set out briefly all his rights, along with the legal procedure in comprehensible language and large print. For in that case the lay assessor could more knowledgeably define his attitude towards those concerned and the evidence. After all, how important it is for the present "silent voices" to play an active part in the dispensation of justice...

EXCLUSIVE FOR NEW TIMES

The KGB and glasnost

The French historian Alain Guérin has visited Moscow to collect material for a book about the KGB. What is he going to tell his French readers?

N.T. What prompted you the choice of subject for your new book?

Alain Guérin. In France people tell me: "You've written a lot about the CIA (and not in complimentary terms, either). Isn't it the KGB's turn now?" Until very recently, there have only been two ways of writing about the KGB: either to eulogize it or to berate it, as all the Western authors are doing. Neither way suits me. Those who have had praise for the KGB are regarded as naive or even as Moscow's agents. I do not belong to either of these categories and hope to smash the stereotype. As I am a regular reader of the French editions of New Times and Moscow News, I can see that everything has changed here, even the vocabulary. I realize that you are moving towards the truth, and I've told myself: "If they are saying such things about Stalin, then they are ready for an honest discussion." When I proposed to the political director of L'Humanité that I write a story about perestroika, the KGB and glasnost, he laughed and then said: "Well, if it works, all to the good. There's no harm in trying..." Many books about intelligence services come out in the West, mostly by ex-CIA men and experts working in research centres. In the same book one finds deliberate lies and obviously authentic information. As for the article for L'Humanité, I've got the material already. Next, I'm planning a two-volume book on the history of the intelligence service entitled "Where Are You, Spy?" Each volume will have 700 pages. It will embrace everything: Ivan the Terrible's secret service, the Okhranka, etc., as far as Russia is concerned.

N.T. What is the biggest problem you have come up against working on the book about the KGB?

A.G. I am after a synthesis, as it were, of Western lies and Moscow's half-truths. Or a synthesis of what used to be dismissed as slander but has turned out to be the truth, and whatever can be learned from the KGB itself, which seems to be willing to open up. The Soviet intelligence service is a prisoner of its own traditions and habits. None of the persons I've interviewed can say simply "an intelligence officer"; it is always a "glorious intelligence officer." KGB men find it hard to admit that they represent a secret service, but stick to the cliché that they are protecting the security of Soviet citizens.



I've been studying secret services for years and I know that they've been set up to break laws for the laws' sake – abroad, for the most part. If any other government body could do what the KGB is doing, there would be no need for the KGB. But no country can do without a secret service. Whatever the differences in political systems, the essence, purpose and practices of the Western services and your KGB are similar, to a certain extent. It is very romantic and touching of the KGB men to call themselves "Chekists," but I think that from the point of view of work methods and technical facilities the KGB has much more in common with the CIA than with Dzerzhinsky's "glorious Cheka" (no hard feelings, please), considering the length of time that has passed since the establishment of the Extraordinary Commission. Incidentally, the KGB is your equivalent not only of the CIA, but of the FBI as well because it combines the functions of intelligence and counterintelligence.

N.T. In your book about the CIA you have drawn profiles of its members. Are we now to expect portraits of the KGB men?

A.G. This is extremely unlikely. First, the CIA men I wrote about had been shown to the American public. The Senate hearings on the CIA activities in the seventies were telecast for all the nation to see, with the CIA chiefs in full view. Incidentally, few believed that the CIA would ever recover from the beating. That was a mistake, the Agency promptly got over it and is now in excellent health. This goes to show that the CIA is a powerful service quite capable of surviving such a crisis. So there is no reason to be afraid of lifting the veil on the secret service's secrets... Second, while tracing the history of Soviet secret services from the outset, one could portray a host of extraordinary personalities. However, even with all the knowledge I have, I cannot bring myself to do so because the result would be a gallery of monsters and heroes... Dzerzhinsky and Sorge, on the one hand, Yezhov and Abakumov, on the other. Truth to tell, all of them ought to be written about honestly, without emotion. In order to label someone an enemy of the people in Beria's times, you had to accuse that person of working for a foreign intelligence service. Beria is now rumoured to have been a foreign agent himself. I think there is no need to think up such primitive explanations.

N.T. Could you share your impressions of your talks with KGB people?

A.G. Meeting with flesh-and-blood KGB men was a most interesting experience. We had very pleasant conversations, although I must say my interviews tended somewhat to schematize history. They told me that before Yagoda there had been real Chekists; that was a good period, "we fought against the enemies of the revolution"; next came a black period (wartime excluded); and now, since Andropov, the Chekists are holding their heads high again... And what about Serov, Shelepin, Semichastny? At first, no mention was made of them at all. The answer to my question was that theirs had been not a black, but kind of neutral period, because none of the three was an outstanding personality. The conversation centred on the war for the most part. "We carry on the glorious traditions of Dzerzhinsky"... Dzerzhinsky and Andropov certainly merit great respect, but surely there haven't only been the two of them. That's the way the KGB would like to see its past, but, alas, there is no changing history. The KGB men weren't altogether happy when I asked them whether they had inherited anything from the tsarist Okhranka. I believe every

country's secret service has its national distinctions and traditions. "We have adopted none of the Okhranka's practices," their answer wars. This sounds incredible because after any revolution, as a rule, the cooperation of experts from the fallen regime is invited.

N.T. You are in a position to judge which intelligence service is more secretive and tends more to surround itself with a stone wall. Do you think there is any relation between the efficiency of an intelligence organization and the degree of secrecy it envelops itself in?

A.G. The CIA is the least secretive of all the secret services. Paradoxically, the obsession with secrecy is not in any secret service's interests. A secret service ought to impress it on the public that there is nothing secret about its work. Indeed, a lot of information can be disclosed without detracting anything from a nation's security. The preoccupation with secrecy smacks of paranoia and is of no use.

I don't know whether it is the case here, but in France the very word "secrecy" has a tremendous appeal to the public. Therefore the papers have an eye on the more secretive services because stories about them help sell more copies. A few years ago, public interest in the CIA waned considerably as it became clear that the National Security Agency (NSA), which is subordinated to the CIA, had a much more important role to play. In a word, the public interest in secret services is often in inverse proportion to the actual role they play.

N.T. What's your idea of a modern intelligence agent? Who is he? A James Bond who relies on his brawn more than he does on his brain? Or a Le Carré character, a non-athletic intellectual spy?

A.G. In my book I've given quite a lot of space to the James Bond phenomenon. In my opinion, James Bond is closer to reality than Le Carré's heroes. The world of secret services is of necessity extremely simple: it is a confrontation of good and evil, friends and foes. This scheme of things leaves no room for scruples. Whenever any nuances appear, secret agents lose their bearings. An ex-CIA director said he didn't care for Le Carré at all: had secret services been the way Le Carré described them, they would never be able to recruit anyone, to infuse fresh blood into their staffs. Secret service agents need simple and clear-cut moral points of departure – say, plain unreasoning patriotism – serving to justify what they are doing. A war justifies killings. But in what is called a secret war, an intelligence agent is forced to deny his involvement in violence because he knows no one will support him, although secret services are part of the state machinery. If an agent finds himself in a complex situation, he needs something to clutch at. It's bad if the wall he leans against suddenly crumbles. If the political situation in his country changes abruptly, he gets utterly confused. He may lose all faith and simply defect to the other side.

N.T. What changes are secret services undergoing in the age of fresh détente, disarmament and confidence building between East and West? Could these services eventually wither away?

A.G. On the one hand, be that as it may, the CIA and the KGB residents in some points of the globe have already learnt to cooperate in certain matters. Or so I think, anyway. This is only natural, because there are dangers that threaten everyone. I mean drugs and terrorism, for instance.

Nevertheless I am of the opinion that the easing of international tension adds to the importance of the secret services. Intelligence agents are coming to play an ever greater role, but so are the cloak-and-dagger men who operate in the "twilight zone," and we must draw a distinction between these two categories. The "twilight zone" begins where the jurisdiction of diplomats ends and where the military have not yet come into play. I wonder whether détente is helping to reduce this zone?

Intelligence services must develop because the more political leaders hug each other, the better each of them should know whether the other man wants to kiss him on the cheek or to grab him by the throat. It is worthy of note that a great many people formerly connected with secret services graduate to top government posts: Vice-President Bush and General Secretary Andropov are cases in point. In the forties and fifties that was true mainly of South American "banana" republics: the military in charge of secret services would stage coups and take over from heads of state by force. This phenomenon is largely due to the high standard of competence secret services set for their men. The intelligence service is emerging from behind the scenes and exerting an ever greater influence on the life of society. I do not see anything wrong with that. Bush is more liberal than Reagan, and Andropov was more realistic and efficient than his predecessors. Neither Soviet nor American intelligence agents are extremists. They rank with intellectuals of the first order. The standard of their professional training is high enough to guarantee them against fanaticism.

A paradox of these services is that while having more information than others, they seek to keep it out of the public eye. This may prevent them from taking a sober view of the world around them. The future depends on whether they succeed in extricating themselves from this paradox.

N.T. Aren't the secret services a source of maniacal suspicion in politics?

A.G. This may be true of such countries as Turkey and Argentina. The superpowers face no such danger.

N.T. And now the last question: are you satisfied with the treatment you've received in Moscow?

A.G. I certainly am. Glasnost and the KGB seemed incompatible. Nevertheless, my questions are answered, and no one shunned discussions with me, although my approaches could well have been turned down, as is sometimes the case in many other countries.

Interviewed by
LEV YELIN
and LEONID MLECHIN

I must admit in all frankness that it was not only the political director of L'Humanité who raised his eyebrows hearing of Alain Guérin's plans. Few journalists would venture to touch such a, let's face it, complex and sensitive subject. And, as it has turned out in the course of the interview, a most enticing and interesting subject too.

His answers are characterized by frankness and judgements that are not bedevilled by stereotypes; he is obviously bent on a profound and objective analysis leading to generalizations and conclusions of interest to the public. Nevertheless, one cannot agree with everything he says. Some of Guérin's views seem to bear the imprint of certain delusions and illusions current in the West as regards secret services. These seem to be difficult to discard even for a well-intentioned researcher.

For instance, as in discussing the purely external similarities between the secret services of different countries, Alain Guérin wrongly ignores their class essence – in other words, the causes they are working for.

Hence his conclusions – inapplicable to the KGB, in my opinion – to the effect that secret services have been set up "to break laws for the laws' sake," that "the KGB's activity is incompatible with glasnost," that Cheka seemed to have "recruited" former members of the tsarist Okhranka, etc.

This explains Alain Guérin's ironical attitude to our set phrases like "glorious Chekists" and "heroic traditions."

Indeed, it would hardly occur to an American or a Frenchman to refer to a CIA or DST man as "glorious."

Hopefully, as he goes along, Alain Guérin has still to discover for himself and his readers a great deal of new information which will make for more balanced and objective assessments. Then he will agree, perhaps, that outstanding patriots and internationalists like Felix Dzerzhinsky, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, Nikolai Kuznetsov, Rudolf Abel, Konon Molody – to name but a few of those who have selflessly served their country – do indeed merit the epithet "glorious" by right.

Y. Kiselyov, Maj. Gen. (Ret.), an honourable KGB member

"We must go all out – and a little more"

Vitaly Ganyushkin

Looking back on the period of stagnation, I recall a typical episode. A top-ranking economic executive sent in an article which, among other (still current) specimens of pep talk, contained the inevitable phrase "We must go all out..." On second thoughts the author, warming to his subject, had added "and a little more..."

This episode came back to me as I perused the resolutions of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, recently published, "On Urgent Measures to Improve Consumer Services," "On Measures Radically to Restructure the Public Services Sphere" and other such decrees of the perestroika era, as it were.

These are, no doubt, government documents of truly national importance meant to gear our whole cumbersome and inefficient economic mechanism to the everyday needs of the people. It's high time something was done about it in earnest, so the documents are most welcome and encouraging. On the other hand, we take them with a pinch of salt because we know only too well, from our rich experience, that resolutions alone cannot improve things as if by magic.

As one goes through these heartening resolutions paragraph by paragraph one can't help but be impressed by their extraordinary significance, and by the concern for the people's welfare with which they are imbued. These documents are obviously in the spirit of the times, displaying all the outward signs of perestroika: new approaches, self-financing, democracy within work collectives, lease contracts. However, they are all garnished with the trite set phrases which seem to have come to our vocabulary to stay: "to work out and implement," "to remove this and improve that," "to make provisions for and guarantee a solution of the problem," "to accelerate the process" and "put things in their proper order." This alone puts one on the alert: to think of all the measures we have tried to "work out" but never "implemented"! Recall, for instance, the much-talked-about campaigns to improve the quality of children's clothing (which remains appallingly bad), dozens of urgent calls to step up housing construction, or our annual resolutions on measures to keep the public supplied with vegetables, potatoes and fruit.

As one becomes sceptical,one starts wondering who all these empty phrases are meant for, and what their purpose is. Let us have recourse to logic. The said resolutions specify for whom they are intended, ranging from national and republican ministries and departments to old-age pensioners, who are also called upon to "improve and ensure." These resolutions have probably been drawn up on the assumption that the appropriate institutions are in a position to carry them out. In that case a legitimate question arises: if the institutions can do so, why don't they? After all, the resolutions demand nothing extraordinary of them. And if they do nothing about the resolutions now, where is the guarantee against their remaining idle tomorrow? Does this guarantee lie in the fact that the government itself tells "the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics, the State Agro-Industrial Committee of the U.S.S.R., the Ministry of Bakery Products of the U.S.S.R., the Ministry of Fisheries of the U.S.S.R. to arrange for food products to be supplied in containers holding 15 to 30 kg each"?

Easier said than done

Are the ministers, chairmen, chiefs and their staffs so dull as to need instructions from the central government on what kind of sacks to sell us potatoes in?

Just try and imagine Mrs Margaret Thatcher decreeing the maximum size of a Beefeater gin bottle. Or Francois Mitterrand ordering that the number of types of cheese available in his country be raised from 400 to 413.27. This practice seems to be all of the order of the day here. Why? My answer is that we still do not have a reliable mechanism for making government instructions incumbent on those responsible for implementing them. Giving an instruction is one thing, but having it carried out is something else again. As for the collective responsibility that our government decrees traditionally rely upon, it doesn't really lend itself to verification. How can anyone find out, for instance, whether precisely 19.2 billion rubles' worth of communal services is rendered in 1995? You can't do it, any more than you can have a suburban train arrive at exactly, say, 16.01.

Hence the logical presumption, based on experience, that – paradoxical as it seems – ministries and their chiefs are all set to receive instructions at government level. This is a surefire ploy intended to produce a cushioning effect: a minister can always say: there wasn't much that I, a humble office-holder, could do in a situation where even govenment resolutions are not complied with. This practice goes to devalue top-level decisions, which turn out to play into the hands of the bureaucrat with his expert knowledge of the rules of the collective responsibility game. He knows better than anyone else that government resolutions are long-term, that no one is going to demand that he implement them overnight, and that he has more than enough time to put them into force or otherwise.

The result is a merry-go-round of resolutions which are actually nobody's business – and, as ever, next to nothing to fill the "containers" with, even little ones, incidentally, the containers themselves are often in short supply.

Is it really containers that the Soviet Government ought to concern itself with? Wouldn't it be more appropriate merely to indicate the names of those who have failed to carry out the current resolutions' provisions for the extensive use of light-weight metal structures, the promotion of services like fertilizer application to land allotments, and so on – next to a list of those whom the government considers capable of doing all this.

That would be in accordance with the spirit and the letter of perestroika! True, the documents in question provide for reinforcing the appropriate services with "well-trained, enterprising and energetic experts." But this, again, sounds like a good intention, no more. If such experts were already at work, there would be no need to adopt a government resolution to that effect. The dynamic resolutions of the 19th Party Conference, and the plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee, not to mention those of the Party Congress itself, would suffice to stir them to efficient action.

And so far, alas, there is only talk about the need "to go all out – and a little more."

Transnational cooperation

This coinage, as yet unfamiliar to us, holds the key to resolving the economic problems of the socialist countries.

Yury Shiryayev,
Corresponding Member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences

In this day and age, national economies are no longer capable of developing on their own, and must be integrated with other economic systems on a supranational scale. The international ties of enterprises and various research facilities are proliferating rapidly. They now number more than several hundred, which confirms the prediction that a transition has begun from the classic pattern of foreign trade whereby finished products were exchanged, to an exchange, whence the importance of cooperation, in which a finished product is generated by the joint efforts of participating nations. There is a clear need for a restructuring of the socialist economy and the mechanism of its economic integration. Society at large also now needs a new technological model of the international socialist division of labour whereby the growth of the turnover of goods would depend on cooperation, and progress would be made from mutual supplies of raw materials and equipment to the import of licences and joint uses of advanced technology.

A joint venture is not panacea

A New Times reader familiar with our previous articles on the subject will immediately think of the joint enterprise. That is indeed the fundamental form of transnational cooperation. It is coming into vogue and, understandably, its standing is being intensively promoted. The purely national production sector accounts for a diminishing proportion of the range of goods manufactured in the socialist countries, while, according to official statistics, the range of socialist enterprises establishing links with each other is continuing to grow. The list of joint enterprises to be set up by members of the socialist community is at least ten times longer than that of those already in existence. It takes no time at all to compile a list, of course, but how should one go about establishing cooperation between partners subordinate to different economic and state systems? What are the conditions for the cost-effective operation of such partnerships based on self-financing and profit?

There are laws covering the operation of joint enterprises and there are also internal and even international legal norms in the pipeline to regulate their operation. As direct parties to transnational cooperation, enterprises can now coordinate their output volumes, although this does not go for all of them, and cooperate with each other in retooling and upgrading production capacity. Each of the countries concerned would, however, like to have more information about the technical potential of its partners, greater legal and economic independence in foreign trade, and more effective coordination between national economies, without which the new model of cooperation won't work.

What are the options before us in coordinating national economic mechanisms? Should they be geared to the requirements of the joint enterprise? Will the expenses incurred be justified? Many socialist countries have passed national legal acts to expand the credentials of economic organizations in international cooperation. In most CMEA countries production syndicates and even individual enterprises are being given the right to plan the production of advanced technology together with their partners, coordinate the range and volume of goods manufactured in cooperation, negotiate the prices of spares and auxiliaries, and use some of their hard-currency profits to expand and upgrade production capacity. Are the joint ventures, so much in vogue today, really the optimal form of cooperation? Let us look into this.

The operation of a joint venture is geared to the interests of **two nations.** Its capacity is limited by the joint potential of the **two countries** concerned. On the other hand, the experience of **transnational** cooperation in production indicates that the going is better where **several** independent partners are involved in the production of a finished product, each accounting for the part of the production process that it is capable of handling. This does not require a restructuring of internal legislation. Nor does it require that production capacity be divorced from the state, or that various problems of legal and economic compatibility be dealt with. Each participant performs its own function and the finished product is a joint asset.

In this way a common market is set up in a certain economic sector, and a common market is what the members of CMEA are now seeking.

CMEA common market

A discussion is under way at present within CMEA and its bodies of ways of creating a common market. That issue topped the agenda at the 44th session of CMEA in Prague this summer. What we need is a normal international economic "metabolism," which in turn calls for a radically upgraded mechanism of mutual cooperation. Any economist could list a sufficient number of arguments to demonstrate that an integrated market is a long way off. Before it materializes, the home markets of the member countries must be balanced, competitive enterprises must be formed in CMEA's manufacturing industries, and mutual access must be provided to wholesale goods. That is no easy task, and dealing with it

will take more than a decade. Viewed from that perspective, it appears to be unreasonable at the least to continue to reject the exploration of the possibilities of socialist transnational corporations, which remains a problem closed to scientific scrutiny.

That is partly explained by our attitude towards the role of transnational or multinational corporations in today's world economy. As the vanguard of international capital, they are pivotal in its effort to dominate the world market and the developing economies. The devastating effects of the invasion of national economies by the multinationals are self-evident, but to what extent are the activities of the multinationals related to essentially capitalist forms of exploitation and what is their relationship to the objective development of productive forces? Clearly the multinational corporations would not have enjoyed so much room for manoeuvre in industrialized and many developing nations if there were no objective preconditions for this arising from the continued internationalization of industrial production worldwide.

There is every reason therefore to consider an issue that we have for a long time deliberately neglected, i.e., whether the socialist countries can rid transnational or multinational corporate activity of essentially capitalist contradictions and use it to their own advantage and,indeed, to the advantage of most nations.

The trends in the development of the world economy indicate that the role of multinational foreign trade ventures is growing. In the capitalist economies, they are undertaken by multinational corporations whose sway extends far beyond the countries where they are based to assume a global scale. The process of the "transnationalization" of production is not confined to the capitals of the leading countries. Developing nations have set up transnational structures of their own, though the amount of business that they do is still comparatively small.

Capitalist multinational corporations are not charities. They exert a dynamic influence on foreign policy and the system of international relations at large and create crisis-prone situations in various regions. Many believe multinationals to be evil.

The process of the transnationalization of foreign trade cannot be comprehensively explained from the point of view of the corporate drive for superprofits. That world phenomenon is explained, as we have indicated above, by the continuing internationalization of economic life and research and development, and the dramatic increase in the role of cooperative links and their geographical scale,

Drawing by N. Shcherbakov

which make it possible to tie up the economic potentials of various nations in major international research and engineering complexes.

That is an objective process and cannot be neglected if we want to promote our foreign trade. In our estimation, the numerous negative trends in the international socialist division of labour such as lack of dynamism, conservative commodity structures and insufficient cooperation in research and development are directly related to the fact that transnational activities have been underrated, and as a result, the potential of various economic complexes using their own resources has been overrated.

The development of various forms of joint economic activity helps create a more uniform economic situation in CMEA and make for conditions conducive to competitiveness and closer cooperation between domestic and foreign manufacturers. The most promising area here is the setting up of major international research and engineering systems capable of ultimately competing with the transnational corporations of the industrialized capitalist nations.

What can transnational corporations do?

An integrated market of the socialist countries is decades away, but socialist transnational enterprise is on the agenda today. It is capable of pooling the manufacturing and R&D potential of the socialist countries without the introduction of unified domestic economic legislation in the countries concerned. At the moment there are quite a few organizations in the CMEA countries which are in effect transnational or about to become transnational.

Socialist transnational enterprise, owing to the flexibility of the forms of relations between our countries, opens up prospects for the socialization of socialist production in real terms, on the one hand, and creates proper conditions for gaining ground on the world market, on the other.

Facing us on the world market in the future will be competition from Western multinationals rather than individual manufacturers. In the circumstances it would be naive to suppose that, while remaining within their national structures of manufacturing and export, the socialist countries can count on having a good chance of success. The situation in the world economy is such that the only option open to us is socialist transnationalism.

Owing to the above-mentioned flexibility, any transnational structure set up within the framework of CMEA may incorporate on a footing of full equality and mutual benefit the research and development and manufacturing potential of

capitalist and developing nations.

Here we have encountered the well-known phenomenon whereby the same economic form assumed different contents under capitalism and socialism. In the present circumstances there are no grounds whatever for rejecting socialist transnational external economic activity. Moreover, in practical terms, such activity has already been pursued. For instance, the international economic association INTERATOMINSTRUMENT set up by Bulgaria, Hungary, the G.D.R., Poland, the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia more than fifteen years ago has been meeting the demand for nuclear technology in these countries. The company produces some 500 types of instrument and parallelism in production is ruled out. There is a special expert service to survey the manufacturing situation and issue recommendations as to where the manufacture of a particular type of instrument should begin. Any buyer anywhere in the world can purchase nuclear technology and instruments from INTERATOMINSTRUMENT in the space of a week through the mediation of one of the company's member countries.

Originally thought of as a coordinating body, the company came to organize the technological integration of that industry in the CMEA nations. For ten years it has worked on a self-financing basis.

INTERELECTRO is in much the same position. Having begun by coordinating the technological policies of the contributing nations, this transnational syndicate is developing its own manufacturing capacity and planning to build the first joint venture by the year 1990. Its products would cost partners in the syndicate a half or even a third of the world market price.

The patterns of cooperation that have emerged in CMEA in the manufacture of computers and nuclear plant equipment can also be described as embryonic transnationalism. Agents of that cooperation are still few and far between, but on the other hand, there is a growing number of industries where the concentration of international efforts is long overdue. For instance, in spite of a notable increase in the manufacture of cars on a cooperative basis in CMEA, the problem of full-scale production of cars has not been resolved. We have failed to meet the home demand for cars and there is no solid basis for car exports to third countries. The situation is much the same with respect to the manufacture of many types of equipment, household appliances and consumer goods.

In the circumstances we must look for entirely new solutions to the old problems, and rely on economic levers that will make it possible to go beyond the national confines of manufacturing processes, and that is only natural. For instance, the Ivanovo Machine Tool Building Syndicate in the U.S.S.R. began by establishing close R&D and manufacturing ties with partners in Bulgaria and went on to establish cooperation with the G.D.R. and, at the end of last year, with partners in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. An agreement was signed on setting up the Ivanovo-Hichkon international syndicate for the production of manufacturing centres and programme-controlled machine tools.

Models

The development of socialist transnational business activity is linked to the creation of an integrated socialist market, but there is no rigid time frame for this. If we set up an integrated market first and go beyond national confines in research and manufacturing, real prospects for socialist transnational activities would be very remote indeed. An integrated market requires the right kind of conditions and in order to be able to pool into an integrated market, the national markets of individual countries must have the opportunity to sustain the flow not only of goods, but production resources as well, and this calls for the appropriate mechanisms to bring the national norms of legal and economic regulation closer together and resolve the complex problems of pricing and currency conversion.

The advent of an integrated market will be preceded by the formation of individual sectoral markets on an integrated basis for personal computers, video recorders, furniture and cars, and it is the job of transnational syndicates to create these markets. Having accumulated practical experience, we can then go on to set up an integrated market. Our own and world experience suggest that international production systems, unlike joint ventures, can emerge even given quite considerable differences between the economic mechanisms of the participating nations, as it is relatively easy to establish relations between the nucleus of a system and its subsidiaries whereby national specifics can be used to advantage. Socialist transnational economic activity can account for the most flexible forms and diversity of conditions in the member countries.

One option is to set up **subsidiaries,** for instance, for the assembly of VCRs in a number of countries on the basis of a national enterprise in this or that country. Such subsidiaries could also ensure servicing and, while maintaining close links with the parent company, would conduct their business in keeing with the legal norms of the country in which they were located. They could also function as national enterprises, and some experience of that nature has been accumulated in the socialist community in the retail trade and catering industries.

Another option is to have an advanced R&D centre perform the role of a **technological integrator,** handing down to its partners an integrated programme for the introduction and replication of the products it has developed. Many international economic organizations already operate on these principles and all that remains to be done to turn them into supranational mechanisms is to draw up a concerted technological policy, deal with the problem of distributing production programmes, and market their products. A joint export company would help deal with that problem.

A more complicated option is **technological mergers between the cooperating enterprises** on the assumption that they will abandon their autonomous technological approach and coordinate all technological procedures in the manufacture of basic products, units, parts and semi-finished products. Here there arises a need for some international organization, or a head office capable of running the national subsidiaries.

The expediency of moving in that direction is evident, although there are going to be difficult problems. One of them is the system of payment for fulfilled R&D orders. Another is the limited number of R&D centres free from departmental tutelage. The internationalization of technology transfer and commerce call for a degree of independence on the part of contributors, without which the principles of self-support, self-financing and cost accounting would not be implemented.

The ultimate result of socialist transnational external economic activity is to fill the international socialist market with high-quality goods and services and thereby create an integrated market in the long term. Its effect is expected to be great in the short term as well, as socialist transnational systems could be accessible even today to all firms and corporations prepared for mutually beneficial partnership.

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Diamonds out of ashes

Alexander Didusenko

To begin with I shall quote a brief report from a Polish paper: the captain of the Soviet dry-cargo ship on its way to the Polish port of Szczecin with 18,000 tons of apatites on board meant for Czechoslovakia has been advised by the consignees to change course and to head for Hamburg.

This involves extra expenses in hard currency but nothing doing. The Szczecin dockers are on strike.

Yes, more work stoppages in Poland. The lifts of Katowice coal mines have come to a standstill, at some factories workers have downed tools. The country is in danger of economic malfunction, shortages, failure to meet its export commitments, industrial arrhythmia, and wage losses. All this tells on Poland's international prestige.

To think how many times Poland's friends the world over have watched such developments with anxiety and pain! And how many times they have recalled the tragic lines by Norwid, the 19th-century Polish poet:

> You are in flames again. And as you fan the flames
> You burn yourself alive without knowing it...
> Are you raising aloft the freedom banner
> Or losing what you've gained in conflagration?
> What will remain? A handful of dead ashes
> To scatter in the wind without a trace left
> Or to reveal a diamond, pure and light,
> Shining victoriously through the ages?

It has been repeatedly stated, with regret, that strikes and crises have never brought Poland any "diamonds." It is plain to all that the aftermath of the stormy years 1980-1981 – production slump, the severance of traditional export and import trade links, a decline in living standards – remains a heavy burden on the country's economy, narrows down the room for economic manoeuvre, hampers the implementation of social programmes.

Let me make it perfectly clear that I am not writing this in order to re-open old wounds, to reproach or, least of all, to lecture anyone.

The Polish United Workers' Party, the Polish government and the trade unions have outlawed strikes. Incidentally, a strike called contrary to the will of most workers before all the other possibilities for settling labour disputes have been exhausted, would be pronounced illegal in any country, whether socialist or capitalist. The majority of the work collectives in Poland did not support the strikers. So more and more of them reported back to work. But as I ponder the causes of the strikes, I can't help asking myself: who stands to gain from them?

Let us start with the fact the whole world has admitted: world socialism is out of the stagnation period. Perestroika is under way in the U.S.S.R. The P.R.C. has embarked upon the road to Chinese-style socialism. Socialist renovation is in progress in Poland, and many other socialist countries are undergoing major changes. Society is getting rid of administrative-bureaucratic anomalies. A great self-purification of socialism has begun, old stereotypes and dogmas are crumbling, new thinking is finding its way into economics, politics and ideology. As socialism is turning its face to man, it is regaining and consolidating trust in, and sympathy for it worldwide. But it is only the naive who may think that such a development suits all, even in socialist countries proper. Glasnost, self-criticism, self-financing and the progress being made in the political dialogue with the differently-minded is taken as a danger signal by the dyed-in-the-wool conservatives and dissidents who, until quite recently, depended for their well-being and careers on criticizing the system which has raised and fostered them; this criticism now sounds like baby-talk as compared with the critical self-analysis which a transforming socialism is subjecting itself to.

Conservatives and extremists find a common ground

Today's Poland faces quite a few problems. These problems, however, can and must be solved through dialogue and agreement, as the latest Plenary Meeting of the PUWP pointed out. On the other hand, the strike fever creates prerequisites for a coalition of destructive anarchistic and bureaucratic conservative anti-reform forces capitalizing on difficulties.

"In the present situation," the Polish historian Jozef Buszko writes with good reason, "strikes jeopardize the far-reaching changes now in progress in Poland and in a number of other socialist countries. What's worse, they can play into the hands of the conservative forces hostile to the reforms.

"I hope I am mistaken," the Professor adds. I hope so, too.

Russian revolutionary democrats and Polish revolutionaries of the last century fought against tsarist autocracy under the slogan which united them: "For your and our freedom!" Today this slogan could be paraphrased as "For our and your socialist future!" When Poland had a hard time, when anarchists at home and Western sanctions put a stranglehold on the country's economy, the fraternal socialist countries showed solidarity with the Polish people in the spirit of this slogan, and supplied raw materials, food and hard currency to them. Frankly, they had to cut back on their own socio-economic development programmes somewhat in order to do that. Today, too, they are solidly behind with the Polish people, with those forces in Poland which want socialism to emerge renovated from the ashes of old notions, schemes, myths and mistakes.

A visitor's impression

From our special correspondent
Albert Pin



On the Saigon River

In Ho Chi Minh City, my constant companion, interpreter and assistant was Thanh Hien, who works at the Foreign Relations Department of the City People's Committee. A graduate of the local university, she then studied Russian in the Soviet Union. Her husband also works at the Foreign Relations Department. Though married for some years, they as yet have no children, a family situation by no means rare nowadays.

Population explosion

Does that mean that the Vietnamese now love children less than they did before? No, the age-old traditions still have a tight hold. Childlessness has no attraction for most young married couples. Most of them, especially in rural areas, would rather have three or four children. In the provinces at the delta of the Mekong River, there are families, for example, with from five to eight sons and daughters. Things are different in towns, among educated people; they are usually not in a hurry to have children.

Vietnam belongs to the group of countries with the highest birth rates. In 1945, the country's population numbered 19 million, while by the middle of 1987 it had reached 62.5 million. Latterly the number of able-bodied members of the population has been increasing by approximately a million people a year. Meanwhile in the per capita production of foodstuffs (the staple Vietnamese food has been and still is rice) as well as in the average income level, the republic lags far behind many Asian countries. As was noted at the session of the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the acute shortage of food is felt both in the town and the countryside. A particularly difficult situation obtains in the northern provinces, where agriculture is making no headway, and as a result, the per capita production of foodstuffs dropped from 264 kg in 1982 to 220 kg in 1987.

As far back as in the 1970s the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam worked out measures on family planning and birth control. No more than two chil dren per family, with an interval of approximately 5 years was the official recommendation underpinned by legislation. The law stated that on the birth of her first or second child a woman working in the state sector is given six months' paid leave, provided with pay, benefits and foodstuffs. If a third child is born the family is not entitled to these privileges. But in actual fact the birth control programme has failed to yield the expected result. For instance, towards the beginning of this year the country's population grew by 2.5 per cent, instead of decreasing by 1.7 per cent as planned. The newspaper Saigon giai phong, published in Ho Chi Minh City, said in this connection that in the struggle against the demographic explosion a more radical approach might, perhaps, be preferable, that is, the statutory enforcement of birth control measures. For that matter they suggest that on the birth of a third child the parents themselves bear the burden of expenditure on medical care and schooling, pay higher rent, etc.

Now that there are more than 32 million citizens of working age in the country, their number is likely to have reached 46 million by the year 2000. Meanwhile 600,000-700,000 townspeople remain unemployed, while 18 million peasants work on average 200 days in the year. Thus, 6 million Vietnamese have no permanent employment. Moreover, about 30-40 per cent of the staff of many enterprises and offices in the state sector could be cut without any detriment to the results of their work. In preliminary estimates, this adds some 800,000-900,000 people.

These figures were made public at the recent conference on the problem of utilizing the labour resources of Vietnam, sponsored by the S.R.V. Ministry of Labour's research centre, concerned with aid to war invalids and social questions.

Landing party on a desert island

"Tomorrow we'll go to the Do Hoa state farm," Thanh Hien informed me. It's a short distance from the city but we'll have to go by the Saigon River. The state farm is located on an island.

...The outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City are so unlike the European-looking quarters of the centre, with their snow-white high-rise hotels and cosy little public gardens. The canals and branches of the Saigon River are strewn with motley barges and junks, permanent homes for those who have no other accommodation. Water-surrounded huts on piles. We drove for quite a while around this "Venice of Asia" before we found the landing stage in the suburb of Nha Be Binh Khanh, from which a motor boat was to take us to the Do Hoa state farm, one of the newly established agricultural enterprises.

We were joined by Nguyen, secretary of the youth volunteer detachments city headquarters which have since 1976 been developing new economic regions round Ho Chi Minh City. Such work is underway on a nationwide scale. The objective is to start the cultivation of fallow lands, increase the production of foodstuffs, raise exports and keep hundreds of thousands of people in employment. In the previous five-year period

alone, more than 1.2 million people moved from the densely-populated Red River Valley and the Mekong Delta to settle elsewhere.

200 thousand families from Ho Chi Minh City have settled in the new regions. Dozens of thousands of young enthusiasts commute there from the city. Twenty detachments are working in different agricultural branches, in industry, construction, forestries, fishing and shrimping... Nguyen herself worked from the age of fifteen in such a detachment.

I had had my first opportunity to visit the new economic regions in 1977, also in the south of Vietnam in the province of Song Be, close to Ho Chi Minh City. On the virgin lands many problems had beset the settlers, most of whom came from towns. They were learning the rudiments of agriculture from scratch. Before they began to sow they had to defuse mines and live American bombs. They lacked water to irrigate the fields. They lived in bamboo huts. The settlers came from different walks of life, 60-80 per cent of them having been soldiers in the puppet army. Many of them also went to work in the administrative bodies in villages and communities. They eaked out a poor living from the land and often went back to the town...

Do Hoa's director Nguyen Tien Dung is a pleasant young man. He has been with the state farm since 1981, that is, since it was first set up. Initially he was deputy director, and in 1985 he became the director. He joined the volunteer detachment back in 1977 as a schoolboy. He is now in his third year on a correspondence course at the agricultural institute. He is a party member...

The state farm covers 2,160 hectares. They have planted coconut palms over an area of 27 hectares, a third of which is already yielding fruit; 340 hectares are taken up by eucalyptus and 300 more will be used to stock up timber (the whole of the island was once forest). The land here is poor, so raising agricultural crops is yet out of the question. All work is done manually. In the morning the farm workers tend the coconut palms (incidentally, they breed shrimps in the irrigation channels), and the afternoon is devoted to fishing (fishing tackle is provided by the state on credit).

500 people work in Do Hoa, that is, more than 40 families. In the main they are former young volunteers. The work on the farm is done on the basis of family contracts. Each family is also given a plot as an individual subsidiary holding. There is a nursery school and a dispensary. Foodstuffs, and in the dry season water, are delivered here on boats from the mainland, as they say here. Recreation is scarce, provided by television and video films with a very limited choice. Married and single people alike sign contracts at Do Hoa for a period of three years. Sometimes people leave before this time expires. Ten families have been with the state farm since its establishment.

In a word, a desert island has become inhabited. This year the state farm is to become a paying concern. But will people live here permanently?

Life-giving current

Ho Chi Minh City is the largest industrial centre not only in the south but also nationwide. The city produces 30 per cent of the country's industrial output. In addition to 650 state enterprises, there are 25 thousand handicraft workshops which employ two thirds of the working population. By expanding them, manufacturing new products and enlisting the help of foreign capital for this purpose the city authorities are able to create extra jobs. These are in great demand as 300 thousand local people are now out of work.

This year, according to the local demographic centre, the city population will grow by a third more than in 1987. This situation is projected nationwide. It is attributed to the lunar calendar, according to which 1988 is the year of dragon. And according to traditional Vietnamese beliefs, children born in the year of dragon will grow up healthy, and be rich and happy...

The noose of unemployment could well be less tight if industry in the city were to go at full swing and not operate at half capacity as is the case now. The experience, know-how, proficiency and skill of thousands of specialists is not being fully exploited. I was told about it openly by managers in some plants and factories, as well as by party personnel.

...From Ho Chi Minh City to the Trian hydroelectric system there is now a 45-kilometre motorway and a 20-kilometre highway built in 1983. At that time these parts were still undeveloped, but now the road is lined with all sorts of houses, some roughly knocked together, others more solidly built and much more attractive. They are occupied by builders, many of whom are likely to stay here forever.

There is a large map at the project headquarters. The chief, Deputy Minister of Power of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Tran Van Danh, describes the specific features of the hydroelectric station and the unique environment of the region. Rising in the southern spurs of the Truong Son, the Dong Nai River flows through a series of complex bends, cutting through the jungle. On this ten-kilometre rapid-filled stretch, the river flows especially fast. The water falls 40 metres from the highest point of a sharp bend to the bottom, which provides ideal conditions for the building of a hydroelectric power station.

The designers made optimum use of the terrain, proposing to direct the Dong Nai's waters to an intermediate reservoir and thence to the turbines. Given the importance and urgency of the project, Soviet organizations started developing blueprints and building simultaneously.

"Even our own projects have not been built so quickly," pointed out the project's chief engineer Renat Iskhakov, with whom we drove over the work area, covering many square kilometres. 300 Soviet specialists work here. Some of our best-known enterprises are supplying equipment for the hydroelectric power station.

Tran Van Danh and Renat Iskhakov talked frankly about the obstacles. The supply of equipment is not complete; some parts still have to be urgently delivered from the Soviet Union by air.

But, despite the shortcomings, early this year the first unit began to operate, increasing the output of electric power in the south of the republic by 25 per cent. They plan to commission the fourth and last unit in the first half of 1989. Towards 1990, when the Trian hydroelectric station starts operating at full capacity, it will generate more than 1.7 kilowatt/hours a year. This exceeds the sum total now generated annually by all electric power sources in the south of Vietnam. Five years after the last unit has been commissioned all costs will have been recouped.

The electric power from this hydroelectric station is awaited by the enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City and other southern cities. It is needed by prospectors and extractors of oil and gas on the continental shelf near Vung Tau-Con Dao, where the oil and gas industry, new for Vietnam, is developing and where the first joint Soviet-Vietnamese venture, Vietsovpetro, is successfully operating. The Trian hydroelectric station will bring plenty of water to the rice fields in the Mekong Delta, and make it possible to install large coffee and rubber plantations in the eastern provinces... This will provide jobs for tens, indeed hundreds of thousands of people.

Hanoi-Ho Chi Minh City-Moscow

Photos by author

Why Winston Churchill said No

Lev Bezymensky

Winston Churchill was right when he warned that strategic plans are hard to change. When questions are asked today as to why the armies of the 1st Byelorussian Front did not cross the Vistula and rush to the rescue, any war veteran knows that a war was on, and that in a war you cannot move armies like pieces on a chessboard.

How was the military situation near Warsaw developing when the uprising began? A definitive study has yet to be made. But even today much has been described. We can only repeat what Polish journalist Zbigniew Zaluski has said about different types of historical material. The first kind is material that is unknown because it has not yet been published, the second, material that is unknown because it has already been published.

From the data contained in the material published by Soviet commanders and military historians to date, the following picture emerges.

August 2. The German forces launched a counteroffensive against the 2nd Armoured Army of the 1st Byelorussian Front. Urgent measures had to be taken to preempt a German strike from north to south along the Vistula.

August 4. Stalin received a message from Churchill conveying the rebels' request for arms and ammunition.

The General Headquarters asked Zhukov and Rokossovsky to present their views as to the possibility of taking Warsaw.

August 6. In reply it was proposed to commit the 70th (reserve) Army and strike with the 3rd and 50th Armies on the left flank of the 2nd Byelorussian Front. The plan was approved, but it was decided to consider the possibility of a broader offensive operation.

Shortly afterwards Zhukov and Rokossovsky submitted the following plan: the front's right wing would strike to the north of Warsaw to establish a bridgehead west of Narev, expand the bridgehead south of Warsaw and subsequently outflank the enemy on both sides. Meanwhile the 1st Polish army was to advance to the north along the west bank of the Vistula. Proceeding from the available resources, the marshals believed the operation could be started on August 25.

To carry out the plan (which was approved by the General Headquarters), troops had to be moved and supplied with ammunition and fuel. Thousands of men and hundreds of tanks and planes had to be transferred. For the planes, new

Soviet commanders discuss the situation with officers of the Polish army.

Concluded. For the beginning see No.33, 34, 35.

airfields were needed far closer to Warsaw than the Soviet Air Force had had in June-July. Note that all this had to be done given an awareness the unfriendly designs of the initiators of the uprising and their principals.

Historians have yet to study all the stages in the development of the situation, from Moscow's initial reaction when confronted with the fact that the uprising had begun without any prior notice (the Soviet leadership declared that "it cannot bear direct or indirect responsibility for the Warsaw action") to further decisions when Stalin wrote to Roosevelt and Churchill on August 22:

"...the Soviet troops who of late have had to face renewed German counterattacks are doing all they can to repulse enemy counterattacks and go over to a new large-scale offensive near Warsaw."

There was, of course, the option of suspending all action. After all, it was President Roosevelt who said on September 5 that he did not share Churchill's opinion that "there now appears to be nothing we (the Allies) can do to assist them (the Poles in Warsaw)." And yet, contrary to the accepted Western version that the Soviet troops "did not want" to help, the Supreme Command Headquarters actually tried to help.

While the troops were massing for flank strikes, the 1st Polish army (General Berling) was to attack Warsaw from the Magnuszew bridgehead along the west bank of the Vistula. But this plan failed: Vormann moved in the Hermann Göring Division along with two other German divisions to prevent the bridgehead being expanded. Soviet troops launched unsuccessful actions on August 14, 19 and 25. Likewise, heavy but unsuccessful fighting was in progress in the Middle Vistula and on the front's right flank. On August 29 the General Headquarters decided to halt offensive operations, with the exception of the right wing of the 1st Byelorussian Front advancing on Warsaw.

A new stage in the fighting began in September with the aim of reaching Praga, the right-bank suburb of Warsaw. This task was assigned to the units of the Polish army and other units of the front. It was not until September 14 that Praga was taken. The General Headquarters began to think about direct assistance, which had now become possible. Stalin asked Zhukov to fly to the 1st Byelorussian Front to "see if an operation to cross the Vistula could be carried out by Berling's troops."

The Marshal remembers

Sergei Rudenko, Air Force Marshal and Hero of the Soviet Union, commanded the 16th Air Army which operated near Warsaw.



Marshal Sergei Rudenko

"I first saw the city in September," recalls the Marshal. "Praga had not yet been taken. Together with Konstantin Rokossovsky and Vassily Kazakov, commander of the front's artillery, we climbed to the fourth floor of a building in Radzymin and saw the smouldering ruins of Warsaw. We did so at some risk, because we were caught in artillery shelling."

But this was not why that day was memorable. Two liaison agents from Warsaw had arrived on the spot, two young women sent by the AL. They asked, among other things, for supplies of arms, ammunition and food to be dropped from the air.

"'What shall we do?' asked Rokossovsky when we got back to the command post. I replied that I thought we should help.

"We put in a direct call to Moscow. Stalin listened to the front commander and then asked:

"'What is your opinion?'

"'I think supplies should be given from the resources of the front and the 16th Army,' said Rokossovsky.

"The Supreme Commander agreed and we set our minds to the new task."

"Couldn't we have brought supplies earlier?"

"Not if you took the task seriously. Until September, the 16th Air Army was based too far away to be able to operate in the Warsaw area. It needed bases for assault planes and night bombers, and they were too far off."

The "History of the 16th Army," which came out after the war, says that its units and formations changed airfields 7 or 8 times each. Although there were more than 250 bases by August, only 24 of them were close to the front line (i.e., 25-100 kilometres). Moreover, all the available strength was engaged in air support for the advancing 1st Byelorussian Front: 1,250 planes were used to cover the bridgeheads alone.

The Marshal continued.

"On September 13 it was decided to send an assault plane to drop a letter to the rebels and agree on signals to be used in delivering the supplies. I assigned the task to Major Borshchev, deputy commander of the regiment, a fine airman. He later became a Hero of the Soviet Union. Borshchev carried out the mission after the third try."

"Is the letter still in existence?"

"I'm not sure," replied the Marshal. "We weren't thinking about historians at the time."

Luckily, the Marshal was mistaken. The text of the letter has been preserved in the archives. It read as follows:

"The Red Army extends combat greetings to the heroic fighters of Warsaw! Having approached the walls of Warsaw, we now have a chance to render brotherly help to you. Today, on September 13, our plane will drop this note to you and at night we shall drop ammunition and food for you. To this end, you must make three camp fires in a triangle on Lelewel Square and Cherniakowska Street or in other open spaces in this area. If you have electric torches, you can use them instead of the fires. The planes will come at 9.30 in the evening, 30 minutes after dark. The parcels will be dropped without a parachute in special packing. To recover them, you will have to make the fires in the middle of your positions in the said areas and have people posted all over the place to watch where the parcels land and to collect them."

All in all, 70 such parcels were dropped and communication was established.

Rudenko decided to act the following day. Here is an account of the operation.

"On the night of September 13, 1944, the units of the 16th Air Army made sorties with 2-3 planes to a mission. A total of 85 planes were involved. 282 sorties were made, of which 19 were to suppress the enemy's air defences and 263 to fulfil the special mission; Target No. 1 – 82, Target No. 3 – 59, Target No. 5 – 122. Of the total number, three planes failed to fulfil the mission due to poor weather conditions. 526 flight hours were flown. Total supplies delivered: 29,838 kilogrammes of food, 1,200 gre-

nades and fuses for them, 68,240 rifle cartridges."

The difficult delivery mission was assigned to the 9th Night Bomber Division of the Guards (Colonel Rasskazov). Also in action over Warsaw was the 2nd Air Assault Division of the Guards. The airmen of the Polish Army took an active part in the operation.

Common cause

Sergei Rudenko said:

"All honour to the English, Polish and American airmen who risked their lives in perilous missions lasting almost 10 hours. It was a great feat. But the idea of dropping parcels by parachute from a height of several thousand metres was doomed to failure. We watched the parachutes swept by the wind to the Germans and even to the Soviet position far to the east. So I chose a different, safer method. We dropped the parcels from PO-2 planes."

Major General Anatoly Menyayev, who commanded the 45th Night Bomber Regiment of the Guards:

"It was impossible to do it from a high altitude and at high speeds. We dropped from 200-300 metres, sometimes even from 100 metres. It was a precision job. We had to hit the target indicated by the signalmen. Once we dropped a dismantled 45-mm gun, and it was recovered by the Warsaw fighters."

Incidentally, Allied air commanders realized that dropping loads from high altitudes was to little effect, as archive documents confirm. As early as August 4, British Air Marshal John Slessor, Deputy Commander in the Mediterranean, reported to London that the operations were not very effective and involved great losses. Other chiefs of staff went along with that assessment. I have cited U.S. General Eaker, who thought it impossible to use the U.S. Air Force to bring supplies to Warsaw.

The odd thing is that the clearer the futility of these flights became, the more frequent and persistent were the requests addressed to the Soviet Union. Churchill wanted the Soviet Union to ensure the Anglo-American air operations by providing airfields for shuttle missions. And this demand was made at a time when the Allied Command knew full well that the only base for such flights (Poltava) had been subjected to a heavy German air raid in late June 1944. The British historian David Irving describes the event as follows:



The situation during the crossing of the Vistula (Polish map). The units of the 2nd and 3rd divisions, which made the crossing, are marked on the map.

On June 21 the Americans, casting all caution aside, sent 114 Flying Fortresses to Ruhland, south of Berlin, on a mission of bombing gasoline hydrogenation plants there. The matter did not end at that, however. Right after the raid Colonel General Ritter von Greim in command of the Sixth Air Fleet informed the General Staff that the bombers had headed for Russia. One of his planes, a He-177, followed them and sent word that they had landed near Poltava, the Ukraine. Goering was overjoyed... and ordered a bombing of Poltava. Two hundred bombers surprised the Russians, dropped 110 fragmentation bombs on the Americans and got away with it leaving behind an enormous sea of flame as 450,000 gallons of aviation petrol had blown up skyhigh. The conflagration illuminated the remains of forty B-17s and fifteen Mustangs."

The base suffered heavy damage and in July-August could accommodate only small groups of planes.

When at last the operation became possible (September 18), 107 Flying Fortresses escorted by 62 fighter planes appeared over Warsaw. Most of the parcels , dropped from an altitude of 4 km, were blown away by the wind.

What was the final tally? Data cited at a conference in Warsaw in 1984 say that the Anglo-American operation involved 305 planes (91 Polish, 50 English, 55 South African and 109 American crews.) A total of 2,472 airmen flew the missions, of these 215 died in action. The loads delivered by the planes contained 1,344 pistols, 3,855 submachine guns, 130 carbines, 14,000 grenades, 45 tons of food and 21 tons of medical supplies. The effectiveness of delivery was **up to 37 per cent.**

Now about the Soviet operation: 4,821 sorties were flown, of which 2,435 were to drop loads, 100 to neutralize air defence in Warsaw, 1,361 on bombing and strafing missions at the request of the insurgents, over rebel-occupied areas and on reconnaissance missions. The loads dropped included: one piece of ordnance, 1,478 submachine guns, 156 mortars, 18,428 hand grenades, 515 kilogrammes of medical supplies and 131 tons of food. The effectiveness of delivery was **between 60 and 80 per cent.**

A heroic deed is always a heroic deed. But the simple idea remains that air support for the uprising could have been far more effective if it had been organized **beforehand** by the joint efforts of the Soviet, American and British staffs and the Polish Resistance forces. So many lives could have been saved and so much suffering avoided!

The Czerniakow bridgehead

Mid-September was an extremely hard time for the Warsaw freedom fighters. But it was then that an event took place that could and should have marked the signal for the start of the uprising. On September 16, the crossing of the Vistula began which enabled the units of the 1st Polish army to gain a foothold in the Warsaw neighbourhood of Czerniakow. They

were supported by brigades of Soviet artillery, sappers and mortar units. However, they found themselves in an extremely difficult position. Stuck in an open space and exposed to murderous enemy fire, the battalions were on the defensive. Contact with the rebel forces was not established. On September 21, Marshal Rokossovsky decided to pull back those troops that had sustained heavy casualties (3,764) to the east bank of the Vistula, to Praga.

In London I was asked: was the crossing of the Vistula the personal initiative of General Berling or had it been agreed on with Rokossovsky? By way of reply I will cite the following fact. Major General Molotkov of the Red Army General Staff and three officers were with the Polish units. To those who question the strength of the landing force, I will reply, not by citing figures but by asking: try to make a landing under heavy air attacks onto an exposed bank. Try to pursue the crossing against a stronger enemy despite a heavy barrage of supporting fire. Try to get in reinforcements when all the other armies of the front are engaged in fierce fighting and there are no reserve troops.

There is a memorial slab where the bridgehead was. Although Warsaw has expanded since that time, this spot on the bank of the Vistula is still open and windswept.

Standing in the wind, you wonder what it felt like standing here forty-four years ago. And you can't help thinking about the valour of the 1st Polish army.

At that time some people chose to ignore its very existence. In a correspondence I saw in the Foreign Office files, the Office asked if Berling's army was in fact in the front line. On August 23 the Foreign Office believed that there was "no evidence whatever" to prove it. Other British documents of the time are full of London's mistrust of the Polish forces that were being born in the liberation battle, the Polish Committee of National Liberation. And yet the situation in Poland merited more serious reflection.

There was much to prompt a more thorough study of the situation. On February 8, 1944, Anthony Eden sent a confidential note to Churchill. The Foreign Secretary wrote of two interesting visitors he had received. One, a Scandinavian, had come recently from Poland and

> **"reported that the Communists had gained ground in Poland, chiefly by the industrial workers... Among these people the achievements of the Red Army and the activities of Soviet propaganda seem to have strengthened the belief that only Russia can save them. The Polish government in London, he said, enjoys little respect in such circles..."**

On February 9 Churchill made a note on Eden's letter: "All this is most interesting." In a memorandum of March 2 Eden stated that Britain did not know how much public support in Poland the Polish government-in-exile enjoyed. Even the Special Operations Executive noted in its report of June 1, 1944:

Ivan Kolos

> **"The Army and people inside Poland adopt a considerably more realistic attitude towards the Russians than the government in this country."**

Serious signals. Unfortunately, understanding of the situation in Poland took a long time to come to the London offices.

Ivan Kolos

I will now permit myself to speak as an eyewitness. I am entitled to do so because on a night in October 1944 (it must have been on October 2 or 3), in a small room and in the dim "field" light, I took down the story of the man who was sitting opposite me. It was a report of an officer back from a mission. The officer's name was Ivan Kolos and his mission was to liaise between the 1st Byelorussian Front and insurgent Warsaw. He had returned from Warsaw.

Returned! That was easier said than done. Ivan Kolos, who had recently recovered from heavy wounds, had swum across the freezing Vistula, not alone, but with a radio transmitter and a radio operator who could not swim. I was told to record the account in the greatest detail. It was immediately submitted to the command.

We at the headquarters knew that the front's command, which wanted to get the most detailed information about Warsaw (and not mere scraps!) had decided to send in liaison officers. We knew that one group had already been landed in the northern part of the city in Zoliborz. On September 21 it was the turn of Lieutenant Kolos. An experienced reconnaissance man despite being only 23, he had worked behind enemy lines and headed sabotage units (one of which included German anti-fascists).

I confess that I did not look for the record in the archives. It was far easier to meet Ivan Kolos, now a member of the Union of Soviet Writers. Between us, we pieced the picture together.

Their plane took off from the airfield near Siedlce on the night of September 21, 1944. Two PO-2 planes were piloted by First Lieutenant Lyashenko and Lieutenant Mikhalenko. They had two planes because they had decided to land Kolos and his radio operator Dmitry Stenko separately.

"I landed and looked at my watch," recalls Ivan Kolos. "It was 1:36 a.m. Dmitry had bad luck: he landed on a broken balcony in Hoza Street and was impaled on the railings. We managed to get him down but his wounds proved fatal. I buried him near the hospital where he died on September 23."

But there was work to be done. Kolos met a group of the AL commanded by Major Sek (his real name was Jozef Malecki). The Soviet officer was given medical aid (he too had been wounded during the landing) and helped to make contact with the command of the Warsaw district of the AK.

"I met General Monter three times. I think Bor was present at the first meeting, but he was not identified to me. I put three questions to them: what assistance did the rebels need, how to establish interaction and what targets to fire at? Monter said: 'We thank the Soviet command for its assistance,' but he declined to go into details.

"Then came the next meeting. When I went there, Monter's aide-de-camp, Captain Korab, warned me: 'You'll be given a negative answer, but my general has asked me to convey to your people the request to drop loads.' Monter said: 'Our command does not expect aid from the Soviets. London will assist us.'"

Despite the "grimaces of high politics," Kolos continued to act. First, he had to establish a radio link. He was lucky to find a radio operator who had been sent behind enemy lines back in 1942. Victoria – this was her code name – began to work for Kolos. Data on targets and convenient

landing places were s ent to headquarters.

They had to work in the most adverse conditions – under bombing, in underground labyrinths, and they had to take the transmitter from place to place. This went on until late September, when Kolos received information that capitulation was in the offing. Capitulation soon became a certainty and the Soviet officer was odered to leave. Accompanied by AL fighters, he reached the Vistula through sewage pipes and crossed the river on the night of October I.

Listening to his account, then and now, I thought: here is true unsung heroism. This is the battle comradeship between the Soviet Army and the Warsaw rebels. Marshal Rudenko recalled that three groups of liaison officers had been dropped. Unfortunately, the names of the other officers sent into the insurgent city are still hidden in the archives. They did not return. We would be very grateful if any of our readers – veterans of the Soviet or Polish armies – could tell us their names.

In the meantime, we have only the account of Kolos, that ordinary hero. Incidentally, his name was put on the list of prospective Heroes of the Soviet Union, but was quietly deleted. Why not redress the injustice now and give his due to this living symbol of Soviet-Polish friendship?

* * *

Years have passed since the Warsaw uprising. The old wounds still smart, but they need not prevent us from studying this important event – its sources, course and consequences. I have already said that when Churchill refused to set up an impartial commission to inquire into who organized the uprising and how, he did not care about the rights and wrongs. These words implied an admission of involvement in organizing the uprising that ended so tragically. Now we want not to apportion the blame, but to restore the picture of events that have gone down in the chronicle of acts of heroism of the 20th century. This task has been accomplished not by the initiators of the uprising but by its participants.

The new and strong People's Poland cherishes the memory of its heroes. Next year sees the 45th anniversary of the uprising. One would like to see the living participants in the street battles and those who helped them at the foot of the monument now being erected in their honour. To see Ivan Kolos, wearing a Hero's Star, veterans of the 1st Polish army, the 70th and 47th Soviet Armies, the 16th Air Army. The veteran British and American airmen. All those who shared in the defeats and victories. ■

NEW TIMES GUEST

Mr Francis Manu, Managing Director of Science Spot Bookshop Ltd., a booking-selling firm that distributes the English edition of New Times in Ghana, has come to the Soviet Union at the invitation of our magazine.

At the editorial offices Mr Manu noted that recently both the lay-out and contents of the magazine had improved. He added that the reading public in Ghana were attracted by the wide range of subjects covered and the in-depth analysis of events both in the U.S.S.R. and worldwide. However, he added, the Ghana market was almost saturated and New Times still had much to do to compete on an equal footing with U.S., U.K. and Indian publications.

Mr Manu believed that the magazine should react to key events sooner, as the time lag could no longer be compensated for even by well-written material about yesterday's news. He also said translations should be freer and not copy the Russian so faithfully.

Mr Manu said he would like to see the magazine deal more extensively with African and Latin American problems, which were of greater concern to the reading public in Ghana.

Our conversations at the editorial offices were fascinating and of great help to the staff, who are now striving to raise publication's standard. It was most valuable to hear what an expert in the workings of the information market had to say. ■

The theatre and perestroika

While the Moscow Art Theatre was on tour in Japan, our own correspondent Vladimir Ovsyannikov interviewed its director Oleg Yefremov, to find out what he thought about the frequent Soviet newspaper comments that the theatre is not keeping abreast of perestroika.

This time we came to Japan with some apprehension, as it had undergone great changes since our previous tour in 1968. Our first time in Japan was in 1958, when the country was just opening up to the world, and we were one of the first European drama companies to perform to Japanese audiences. Incidentally, that was how we were received, not as a specifically Moscow company, but as representatives of what I would term European psychological art. When we came the second time in 1968, the Japanese, as I happen to know, felt let down. Our company was still in full flower and we presented not only "Kremlin Chimes" but also, for instance, Chekhov's "Three Sisters." We had a new cast, but in the ten years since our first tour, the Japanese had formed a good idea of the theatre, and their wish to see something "new" had not materialized. By now Japanese audiences have been treated to performances by the world's finest companies, while their own theatre has flourished in a way that was inconceivable in the 1950s. That is why I felt so apprehensive. Suppose Japanese theatre goers were to remark: "The Moscow Art Theatre? So what? We've seen it before, who needs it now? You'd do better to show us something else." However, our performances evoked real interest. When the curtain goes up I'm never in the hall. Sometimes I peep out from the wireless booth, so as not to jump onto the stage, completely forgetful of where I am, and shout the cast to act differently! At any rate when you peep at a Japanese audience you can see how receptive they are.

Would you say they were sizing you up?

Oh, no. During Chekhov's "Seagull" I could see them weeping! That's not "sizing up," as you put it. I have a warm spot for the kind of theatregoer who wants to experience vicariously what's happening on the stage. To judge from the reviews in the press, the Japanese understood and even formulated the meaning of "The Seagull," which is that every human being, provided he really is a human being, can break out of the basest, most hum-drum existence and reach genuinely human heights.

(After "The Seagull," the group presented another Chekhov's play, "Uncle Vanya," and M. Roshchin's "Mother-of-Pearl Zinaida." The company had no reason for anxiety, as the Japanese gave a fine reception not only to Chekhov, whom they admire, but also to Roshchin's play which is difficult and chockful of present-day Soviet reality. Hence there is every reason to say that the tour has been a success. So no more about that.)

Everybody's talking about democratization and democracy today. What do you think about democracy in the world of the theatre? Who is the stage director – a dictator imposing his will on actors, or a liberal ready to listen to their opinions?

Let me tell you what we need in order to understand the issue. This aplies generally to the country as a whole, what it, including naturally the theatre, had become. The transformation took place not during the notorious "years of stagnation," which, as I see it, were an attempt to sit on the fence. It was rather awkward, but still we did it. But now, with perestroika, we must try to get out of that position. I really don't know what new position we'll be able to take, but we certainly cannot sit on the fence.

A few words about the changes. In Khrushchev's day, I was at a dinner of the kind the leaders of the Party and government used to arrange for creative workers. I happened to be sitting next to one of the then leading ideologists. I had made his acquaintance long before, but now he had made a career, was in power, and longed to organize something resoundingly new. Khrushchev trusted him in the sense that "this chap can do anything, organize everything." As we talked, he complained: " Everything now seems okay and everything can be accounted for and is stable. Except for the writers. Their's is a liberal profession. You can't make them do something, you can't control them. Wouldn't it be a good idea to have these writers, for instance, on the staffs of magazines and journals?" He was quite serious.

So what I want to say is that our Soviet type of theatre is a service known as the Soviet repertory theatre. It's absolutely identical, whether in the provinces or in Moscow. This type of theatre emerged before the war gaining headway in the struggle against what was termed formalism, for which many were forced to pay a high price. It acquired what one might call an "aesthetic and ideological basis." Incidentally, that concerns not only the theatre world, but Soviet art in general. In the theatre world this had its supreme embodiment in the Moscow Art Theatre, which the entire country was forced to imitate. If a theatre wasn't like the Art Theatre, that meant it was not a Soviet theatre and could find itself in a bad way.

So what is the Art Theatre? Initially it was a group of like-minded people with a specific structural organization and a characteristic democracy inherent in its art. Small wonder it had so many studios. However, everything eventually became a civil-war partnership of commanding officer and commissar. Now the theatre manager is concerned not so much with organizational or financial matters (which is the case everywhere else), as with "ideological purity" of theatrical productions. What is more, he leaves financial matters to his deputy. This structure of the Moscow Art Theatre was applied to every single Soviet theatre, which did both it and the theatre world as a whole a signal disservice.

So when you ask me whether the director is a dictator or not and whether democracy is not really democracy, I can only say that everything depends on the type of theatre, on the type of art. The basic

objective is not to cope with the problem of what rights the actor or the director may enjoy, but to make it possible for theatrical companies of the most varied kinds to emerge. For instance, a one-man theatre, even a one-play theatre. Or perhaps a theatre without a stage director at all. Why not? Who knows what practice might produce? Thank God, this sort of thing has begun. With difficulty, it's true, but it has all the same... In Moscow we are seeing different companies springing up. True, without generating any perceptible artistic results as yet.

As for the dictatorial type of stage director, one might mention Meyerhold. He had to have actors who understood his aesthetic programme, had absolute faith in his creed and catered to his genius. But there can be companies of a totally different type, as was the genuine, initial Art Theatre where everything was built on the skill of the actor, the ensemble. Here, though, you'd have to have a stage director and an actor who understood the theatrical creed in precisely that fashion. The stage director and the cast must have a free hand.

"All the world's a stage and all the men and women merely players." Indeed, no art reflecting life is so closely related to society's social, political and economic structure as the theatre.

Very true.

How far does the situation in the Soviet theatre world reflect the situation in Soviet society?

About half so far. As in general nowadays, there is more talk than anything else. We now elect stage directors. But what on earth for? We have to start from scratch. At the Union of Theatre Workers, we have come to realize that whereas opportunities are required to allow companies to appear, we also need a situation wherein companies could fade out and close down. There is nothing to be afraid of, should they fail. But to have that we need a social base. So far we just have heated debates. There are, it is true, novel performances, and theatrical life is in full swing, but for the time being it is not following any distinct trend.

Are not studios, groups and trends the theatrical analogue of political pluralism?

Of course. Why does the theatre always get it in the neck first? Even though, compared with the cinema, it has a smaller audience? Still, the focus is always on the theatre. From the angle of "vigilance." As if to oversee what's going on there. Such is the theatre, an art directly linked to life in scale and time. In the cinema, you shoot a picture, cut and paste it together and so it remains once and for all. But in the theatre you are faced with a living audience night after night.

There are two opposing views as regards the theatre's emotional impact or, in other words, specific audience reception. One is that the audience should forget they are in a theatre and separated from the action by the footlights. The other is that the audience must always bear in mind that they are seeing make-believe.

These two trends are continually at war with one another. One trend wants to involve the audience and make them share the experience. The other, of which Brecht was so striking an exponent, seems to tell the audience that they are in a theatre and though they do not necessarily have to share the experience, they must try to understand what it, the theatre, wants to say. These two trends have been disputing the issue ever since the theatre began. The theatre cannot develop without this dialectic, which we had to forego when the entire Soviet theatre world was forced to imitate the Moscow Art Theatre under the anti-formalism slogan. After all, Brecht is nothing new. Meyerhold initiated that in this country early this century.

But didn't you also want to initiate something new in 1956?

That was different. On the contrary, we were all members of the Moscow Art Theatre, but realized how false and detached from life it was at the time. We debated the issue with the Art Theatre precisely from the stance of Stanislavsky's Art Theatre. No wonder so many critics were disappointed when the Sovremennik company emerged. That's nothing but the old Art Theatre, and isn't what we need, they intimated. When the Taganka theatre was organized, they said that was exactly what they needed. If the Sovremennik is heir to the Art Theatre, then the Taganka is heir to Meyerhold and the Blue Blouse company.

Do you mean to say the Art Theatre thus served to stimulate the emergence of different theatre companies?

In this country the Moscow Art Theatre produced everyone, including Meyerhold, who was one of its founding fathers. It was the dramatic studios of the Art Theatre that in feeling their own way and conducting their own creative experiments, not only brought new companies into being as, for instance, the Third Studio, which became the Vakhtangov theatre, but also gave a new lease of life to the Art Theatre itself at its time of crisis or ordeal, as did the Second Studio, which gave us Tarasova, Prudkin, Dobronravov and Khmelyov. What is the Sovremennik? Another Art Theatre studio. When Art Theatre veterans realized that the crisis had reached boiling point and negotiated with me in 1970, I realized that the hour had come and the Sovremennik could inject new blood into the Art

Theatre. However, the Sovremennik announced that it already was a theatre, but that the Art Theatre was no longer a theatre, but a cadaver which could not be reanimated. So I took the plunge by myself. Afterwards some members of the Sovremennik company followed.

Quite a number, I should add.

The main thing is that they definitely reanimated the Art Theatre.

Well, now a question about the theatre today. You had a real split. Do you expect another? Or are you satisfied that this is now a marriage of like-minds?

Well, I wouldn't say that. There are very many complex, novel issues, natural problems that spring up nowadays in my half of the split. This primarily concerns the change of generations. If one simply recruits young, gifted actors, one doesn't get far as a rule. That is why I always encourage my gifted youngsters to take part at the same time in the work of one or other studio, in other words, try to make the grade by themselves.

I think my youngsters are ethically better than my generation, as the latter have had their lives, and it appears impossible to shake their grandeur. The theatre will fail to progress when faced with all that. It's like a bicycle, which falls when it stops. Youngsters will work nights without end. However, the end result, the success, is something else. It all boils down to the audience's mentality. The audience wants names. Nemirovich-Danchenko used to say that the audience was the theatre's worst enemy as regards progress. Because when the audience falls in love with somebody or something, it wants that somebody or something to remain the same.

Do you mean to say you have to train the audience?

Of course. The audience is not a conscious enemy.

What theatre would you see as the ideal?

A theatre that has everything. Many may think this obsolete, but the basic principles of the Art Theatre were formulated, and its aesthetic programme defined by its founders: Stanislavsky and Nemirovich-Danchenko. And, of course, by Chekhov. So I see the formula of the ideal theatre as the aesthetic of yesterday and the ideas of today.

Now about the Union of Theatre Workers. Its objective is, by following a parallel course with the official cultural authorities, to facilitate in every conceivable way improvements in the life, working conditions, and creative processes of the theatre world. Is that parallel course producing anything?

Yes. Even to the point of our venturing onto the international scene.

Previously you had the All-Union Theatrical Society. Why was it necessary to organize the Union?

It enjoys more rights and has a different standing. The Society sprang up before the revolution as a charity outfit to aid actors. Now it has become "an implement of ideological education," a bureaucracy stifled by red tape.

The theatre, incidientally, started out on perestroika first, before newsmen did. Before the 27th CPSU Congress, the theatre, in Moscow at any rate, staged a whole broadside of shows that startled everyone. They included "Silver Weddings," "Speak Out," "The Article," "The Dictatorship of Conscience," and "The Last Visitor." However, I think the theatre should occupy itself to a lesser extent with what is the job of the newspaperman. Therefore, I find it only logical that journalists writing on topical, philosophical, social and economic subjects have come to the forefront. The writer meanwhile should reinterpret all that. Today the times are so contradictory that I can easily understand people who can't produce something all at once. Today, when everything has been turned upside down, incisive thinking is called for. We must prepare things, apply the scalpel.

Recalling the days of the "first attempt," in the late 1950s, it was poets and prose writers who rushed to the fore immediately. Not journalists. The impression was that the literati were then ready to start.

Have you ever paused to think why there was no journalistic boom at the time? Simply because, despite the 20th Congress, there was no glasnost, no democratization. Journalism simply could not take the lead. No wonder it was poetry and the theatre that did so. But today, when journalism is out in front, art can and must take stock of everything.

Don't you feel art is divorced from the public at large, especially in the provinces? After all, don't you often hear it said: "It's all very well for you to wallow in aesthetics and art, but we over here must think of our daily bread first."

I won't fall for that line. A man worthy of the name would never let material want suppress his yearning for beauty. Rather it's not by bread alone... But elitism is certainly a serious issue. I suppose some aspects of art will always be elitist at one time or another. Today most cinemagoers will not rush to see Tarkovsky films. But in a few years these films may be seen in a totally different light, inasmuch as the problems that were of concern to Tarkovsky will be of concern to a far wider range of people.

What would you say about the idea of Russian cultural integrity regardless of where its exponents have been or are? For the time being we have no access to many cultural assets, either because we repelled them, or were reluctant to accept what was offered. What problems of a historical, aesthetic and psychological nature have arisen in that connection? And how are we to retrieve what has been lost?

That will be no simple matter. It too is linked to perestroika. I think we ought to set up a team of ten people or so "above suspicion," like Academicians Likhachev and Sakharov, and the writer Zalygin, and have it examine aspects of culture. And not just culture for that matter. Why not science too? Why did I name Academician Sakharov? Because some scientists have been and are outside the country.

It is my conviction that the conclusions a team like that would draw would be sufficiently prestigious and fair. I also think the time ripe to set up committees in defence of perestroika.

But that might lead to dangerous things. Take Pamyat, for instance.

I find it detestable and repulsive wherever such movements are based on ignorant anti-Semitism. The humane ideas of perestroika need the resolute support that only the clean, strong hands of the people can give.

TOKYO

Photos by Irina Nesterova

The political weekly New Times provides a full and clear picture of highlights in the Soviet Union and the world

New Times comes out in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Polish, Czech and Greek, and is read in 114 countries.

Next year subscribers will get two free supplements on topical aspects of world affairs.

You can place your subscription for New Times with distributors of Soviet periodicals in your country.

Chatichai Choonhawan,66, former career military, successful businessman, experienced politician, has been officially appointed prime minister of the Kingdom of Thailand early in August.

Chatichai Choonhawan belongs to the Thai aristocratic elite. The Choonhawan clan controls financial companies, textile works, hotels. He chalked up experience in family business and heading insurance companies.

Chatichai Choonhawan is a graduate of the prestigious Royal Military Academy Chulachomklao and of the armoured troops school of the U.S. land forces at Fort Knox, Kentucky. In the 1940s he served in the army of Thailand. In 1960 Chatichai Choonhawan took up diplomatic career and for the subsequent 12 years served as ambassador in Argentina, Austria, Turkey, Switzerland, Yugoslavia. In 1972 became Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in 1975-77 held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Kukrit Pramoj. Though Choonhawan speaks ironically about his own activity as a diplomat, he chalked up a few major diplomatic victories – improvement in relations with the People's Republic of China, successful negotiations with the Arab countries on the purchase of oil at reduced prices. In 1972 he was the chief government spokesman at the negotiations on the release of six Israeli embassy officials in Bangkok captured by the Arab terrorists.

Chatichai Choonhawan took part in the foundation of the Thai Nation party, and in 1986 he became its leader.

Millionaire Choonhawan, going by the Western press, is a sociable, witty, vivacious and cheerful man, when young he had a reputation of a passionate dance-lover, now an inveterate tennis and golf player.

In politics Chatichai Choonhawan adheres to a pro-West orientation but at the same time, he intends to promote trade with Thailand's socialist neighbours saying he "would like Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea to become business markets rather than battlefields."

Reputed economist and observer **Vasily Selyunin** co-authored by scholar Grigory Khanin has refuted the official figures for the growth rates of our country's national income for the past sixty years. Their article "The sly figure" sparked off lively discussions.



Vasily Selynin was born in 1927 in the Kirov Region. Two months before the end of the war he is called up to the army. On demobilization in 1946, having learned a trade of electrician, he goes to Barnaul to work there as a motor coiler at the weaving mill, and to finish evening school. In 1949 he applies for entry to the department of journalism at the philology faculty of Moscow University.

"That year 17 applicants contested one place," he recalls. "The only thing that helped me out was that I as an ex-soldier had certain privileges in entry. After the university I worked in Orlovskaya Pravda for two years, then in Krasnaya Zvezda, hence I went to work in Stroitelnaya Gazeta. I started as a writer on agricultural problems, then switched over to "the builders'" publication, and to Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta... And what about the interest in statistics? Perhaps, from the time I entered the Higher economic courses at the State Planning Committee. It was 1966...

"Current is the view that a handful of executives are entitled to have objective information in this country. Alas, these have no objective picture in its entirety either," he goes on to say. "At the top they have more information, that is as simple as that. But the ways and means it is handled remain the same across the board. As a result, the true state of affairs is often distorted which, naturally, affects the decision making."

Vasily Selyunin wrote the book "The economic reform in the U.S.S.R." published in Poland, he co-authored the textbook "The talks on the economic reform" which ran into several editions.

India's film superstar

The southern Indian state Tamil Nadu, or to be more accurate, its capital Madras is regarded along with Bombay the chief centre of India's film industry, and India's film superstar is unquestionably Tamil actor Rajanikant (his real name is Shivaji Rao).

He does not look very much like "a superman" which is probably the very reason why he has won such popularity in Tamil cinema.

Native of Karnataka, the state neighbouring to Tamil Nadu, he was born in a poor Marathi family. Poverty compelled Rajanikant to take all sorts of jobs, in 1973 he even worked as bus conductor. Three years later he managed to become a student at the actors' school.

Tamil film director K. Balachandar thought that Rajanikant's looks made him perfect for negative parts. Appearing once in a while in Tamil films as a "villain" the actor soon gained popularity. The crown of his "villainous career" became the film "16 Years of Age" (1977) which ensured the actor's success. Now he himself could make a choice as to what role in a film he would like to play.

Rajanikant has taken part in 115 pictures. In August he made his international debut. In the film "Heliotrope," showing now in the United States and which is a joint production of the Indian film company Amritraj Production and American NRI MetroFilm Corporations, he plays the role of a taxi man who saves an American married couple from a gang of smugglers.

S. Irodov,
our own correspondent,
DELHI



Well-known American film director **Martin Scorsese,** who made such pictures as the "Taxi Driver" (prize winner of the Cannes festival), "The Last Waltz," "The King of Comedy," presented his latest work, "The Last Temptation of Christ," based on Nikos Kazantzakis' best seller of the same title. In Scorsese's interpretation (as in the original) Jesus Christ had to go through Satan's final test already on the cross. The dimmed eyes of the crucified see the pictures of peaceful, happy life which he could have had, had he once made a different choice. He sees himself as an old man sitting on the porch of his house, looking at his grandchildren playing, and recalling with a smile the doubts of his younger days. How wisely he did to have chosen the path of man! What madness was his desire to save the world! How happy he feels now that he has escaped the tortures and horrors of the cross! But then the crucified furiously shakes his head and the vision disappears. No, he is not a coward, not a traitor, he has fulfilled the mission entrusted in him by God! A triumphant cry is heard: "It is accomplished!"

The authors of the film trace the way not of God but that of man. Early in the story Jesus even gives a helping hand in crucifying a man which would hardly be to the liking of the orthodox audience. Though Nicos Kazantzakis in the preface to the novel expressed the hope that the reader on getting through the book would love God even more, the show of the film sparked off a 25-thousand-strong demonstration of protest in Hollywood. The film was labelled as blasphemy, the demonstrators blocked the territory of Universal Studios, they held the posters: "God is not mocked," "Lead us not into temptation," "They know not what they do."

The American press described as a horrible paradox of the Vietnamese war the tragedy of Admiral **Elmo Zumwalt's** family. His son, who during the Vietnamese war became exposed to the Agent Orange defoliant, died of cancer at the age of 42.

Admiral Elmo Russell Zumwalt was born in 1920 in a doctor's family, and himself was going to become an army

physician. But the stories told by a family friend, the old salt, made him change his mind,and he entered the naval academy. In 1942 he graduated from the academy with success, though he had been in his tutors' bad books for his attitude towards meaningless regulations, was commissioned an ensign, and served on destroyers until the end of war. After the war Zumwalt continued service and went on with his education. His brilliant abilities attracted the attention of Paul Nitze who, on becoming the U.S. Navy Chief of Saff, took Zumwalt along as his executive assistant. Zumwalt did very well at work and was awarded the Legion of Merit. In 1970 he already was an admiral and chief of naval operations. Holding this post, he translated into life several reforms he had been thinking about way back at the academy: he relaxed some rules regarding grooming, dress and shore leave, allowed sailors as free a life style as is compatible with the necessary discipline and abolished make-work and "panic painting," for making an impression on visiting senior officers.

During the Vietnamese war Zumwalt commanded the U.S. naval forces in Vietnam, was awarded many orders and medals. It was he who gave the order to use defoliants in the Mekong Delta. One of those who executed the order was Zumwalt Jr.

The height queen

Stefka Kostandinova,the star of the first magnitude among the world's best high jumpers, was born in Plovdiv in March 1965. Her first serious success came to her when she was a sixth-grader. At the national competition of Bulgarian pioneers in Sofia she scaled 1.66 m indoors. With each year passing, Stefka was confidently "gaining height" looking forward to conquering the coveted 2 metres.

" I am fond of jumping and that is why I see the competition against my rivals as a festival. The contest is the best way for training, thinks Stefka. Each of her victories brings her a step closer to the world record. Having scaled late in 1984 the height of 1.96, she sets the indoors record for Bulgaria.

Since then Stefka Kostandinova has had an unbeaten record. Outdoors



and indoors she has more than once won the national championship, been first in continental and world championships, won cups and broken European and world records, she walked away with the gold medal at the Goodwill Games in Moscow... 2.00 and 2.04, 2.06 and 2.07, 2.08 and finally 2.09 metres. Last year's world track-and-field championship in Rome saw her latest outstanding achievement.

"I am thinking about 2.10 and higher. I feel 2.12 could be conquered too..."

A physical-culture institute student dreaming of becoming a sports journalist, Stefka Kostandinova has been twice (in 1986 and 1987) awarded the Sport Oscar gold prize. Last year she was acclaimed the best sportswoman of Bulgaria, the Balkans and Europe, while the French weekly L'Equipe proclaimed her "the track-and-field queen of 1987." Among Stefka's numerous awards only an Olympic award is missing. She hopes very much to add a Seoul Olympiad gold medal to her collection.

A. Kun

Demand for Soviet soccer players

The Committee for International Sports Contacts of the U.S.S.R. and the Dynamo Soccer Club of Kiev have signed a five-million-dollar contract with Italy's Juventus sports club and its sponsor, the FIAT Company. Under the contract, Alexander Zavarov of Kiev Dynamo is to defend Juventus' colours for three years.

This form of cooperation, unusual for Soviet athletes, is commented upon by **VYACHESLAV KOLOSKOV,** Head of the Soccer and Ice Hockey Administration under the U.S.S.R. Committee for Physical Culture and Sports, Vice-President of the International Federation of Football Associations.

"How did the negotiations about Alexander Zavarov go, and what do you think is the reason for the current interest of foreign clubs in Soviet soccer players?"

"Speaking of the present decade, our boys first attracted serious attention in 1982 after the Soviet national team had put on a brilliant performance against Brazil at the World Cup in Spain. Foreign clubs started sounding us out as to whether we were willing to export soccer players. Unfortunately, the only answer we could give them then was 'we can't.' True, in the early eighties V. Zinchenko of the Leningrad club Zenit did play for Rapid, Vienna. But that was something of the order of an advanced training spell on a non-commercial basis.

"The second wave of interest in Soviet soccer players arose after the 1986 World Cup in Mexico where we made a pretty good showing in the games versus the French and Hungarian sides. A number of foreign clubs approached us about Yakovenko, Dasayev and Belanov.

"In 1987 we were allowed to let our boys out as 'player-coaches.' That was the formal title of their job – as you know, we do not admit to having professional sport in this country. Today, Dynamo's Blokhin plays for Vorwärts, Vienna, and Spartak's Khidiatullin for Toulouse, France, both with a real success. And now, Alexander Zavarov is to play for Juventus, Italy."

"Are the contracts signed according to the standard terms accepted on the Western soccer scene?"

"We sort of 'lease' our players. Any Western soccer player can be used by the host club as it thinks fit; he can be resold to another club, for instance. This does not apply to our players.

"We protect Soviet athletes' rights in this way. But there is another difference, of completely the opposite kind..."

"You mean 1,200–dollar-a-month salary which the U.S.S.R. State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports (Goskomsport) reportedly pays Zavarov?"

"Right. In Italy, players in his class get at least 150,000 dollars a year. We could have secured from Juventus not only a five-million-dollar contract with us, but also a contract with the player himself. This would have spared him the inferiority complex produced by the knowledge that his foreign colleagues who are to be his team mates for the next three years are paid ten times more. Moreover, Goskomsport would not then have to spend

hard currency on the player's salary."

"Who is to blame for this discrimination?"

"An instruction issued by the Ministry of Finance of the U.S.S.R. According to this instruction, our soccer players' pay, in hard currency, should be no higher than an embassy superintendent's but no lower than a janitor's. Where the pay comes from makes no difference. The same instruction forbids a player to sign a private contract with the host club."

"Aware of all this, the managers of the Italian club are meeting the player halfway. Juventus has rented a two-storey villa for Zavarov, put a car at his disposal free of charge, and offered him small sums as pocket money. That's very nice of them, of course, but a bit humiliating to the player, don't you think? Wouldn't he feel better if he could pay for all this out of his own pocket, if he were paid enough to be able to afford the necessities of life, at least?"

"Where will the money to be received under the contract go?"

"A million dollars will go to the state budget, and two million to the U.S.S.R. State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports for the promotion of other, "unprofitable," sports such as rowing, boxing and sailing. Another two million will be handed over to the Kiev club Dynamo, which is to go over to full self-support as from 1989, and which proposes to spend most of the sum buying equipment and outfits for trainees at its junior sports school."

"Is this a purely business contract, then?"

"Not at all. The financial consideration had a role to play here, of course, but the main idea lies elsewhere. After the latest European championships, for instance, Italian, West German, Spanish and even British clubs offered to buy almost all the players on our national team. However, we declined the offers on the grounds that the interests of Soviet football, and Soviet fans, should come first. There are not only Spartak or Dynamo enthusiasts; individual players like Cherenkov, Rodionov, Litovchenko, Protasov also have their admirers. This is why we let our players out only by way of an exception."

"What are the criteria you go by in selecting such players, and what's the purpose of 'exporting' them?"

"Sometimes a soccer star just cannot come into his own here. But time waits for no man, and lest their style should be ramped they must work under different conditions, alongside the very best. In such cases, if the 'home' club does not object, and if the player in question has a long and worthy record of defending its colours, we may send him to play abroad – in appreciation of his services, so to say. He is supposed to be no younger than 29 (Zavarov, 28, is an exception).

"Besides everything else, the player's performance on a foreign team is good publicity for Soviet sport. When Blokhin plays for Austria's Vorwärts, every match featuring him draws a much larger crowd than usual – people come specially for his sake. It certainly feels great to see a stadium aflame with the Soviet flags that excited fans bring along. The same thing happens in Toulouse. Every national paper, not to speak of local ones, makes a point of complimenting Vagiz Khidiyatullin on his game. We certainly consider it a privilege that Juventus, one of the wealthiest European clubs (it belongs to the FIAT company) has invited a Soviet player.

"By the time Zavarov comes back – a graduate of a teacher's college, he plans to take up coaching – he will have learnt a lot about professional soccer, the way professional players are trained, and the interrelations between players and their coaches. After all, don't we send our best opera singers to La Scala so that they can perfect their skill there?"

"Who will be next to go?"

"Rinat Dasayev of Moscow Spartak. The Spanish club Sevilla and Atletico of Madrid want him. Kiev Dynamo's Belanov, Protasov and Oleg Kuznetsov have also been invited to play for foreign soccer clubs. But the final decisions rest with the managers of Soviet clubs."

I met Alexander Zavarov at Goskomsport's training base in Novogorsk where he and other members of the Soviet national team were being coached for an elimination match versus an Icelandic team. The interview immediately preceded their departure for Reykjavik.

"Alexander, please say a few words about yourself for the benefit of our less well-informed readers."

"I took up soccer at the age of 7 in the Olympic hopefuls' school at the Zarya team (Voroshilovgrad), which had just made the top league then. I had the good fortune to have Boris Fomichev as my coach. Unfortunately no longer with us, he taught us scientific football, and saw nothing wrong with my weakness for elaborate dribbling, even if it was to little purpose. At 12, I first discovered how great it feels to win: in 1977 my neighbourhood team was placed second in the Ukraine in the Leather Ball Prize competitions. I am now married with two sons – Sasha, 6, and Valerik, who is only nine days old. I shall reach Turin on September 5. I hope my wife and kids will join me there a month later – provided, of course, that bureaucratic formalities don't hold them up, as is sometimes the case. I realize that Olya is now having a hard time, but that's nothing as she's used to it by now. Some years we were together for only 65 days out of 365."

"What is your frame of mind as you leave for Italy?"

"I'd call it purposeful. I am determined to find out what Italian football is really like. I've never seen Juventus in action at first hand, only on video. I am not conceited, but somehow I feel that I'm in the same class as the Italians."

"When did you learn that you had been invited to the Italian club?"

"First Valery Lobanovsky, Dynamo's senior coach, just asked me whether I was prepared to play abroad at all. I said I was. Then, at the beginning of August, they told me that a contract had been signed with Juventus. Then we went to Italy for a tournament, and I learned there that the news of Zavarov being under contract to play for Juventus had been reported by all the Italian papers a month before. So I was the last to know about it."

"Have you met anyone from Juventus yet?"

"Yes, when we were in Italy we had a thorough discussion with the club's executives. That time I did not meet Dino Zoff, the senior coach. According to a Turin paper, though, he saw a game we played there on TV and liked me. On September 7, Juventus will play an UEFA cup-tie, and on September 9 the Italian Soccer Championship starts. So I'll have to get down to work rightaway."

"You are a centre half-back. Do you enjoy scoring goals yourself?"

"Well, passing a ball to someone at a vantage-point and then seeing it kicked home also makes me feel good. But a goal is a goal, and when I score one myself, it's a terrific pleasure. Fans will understand me."

Interviewer

Boris BALKAREI

JUNIOR WORLD



Two faces of one committee

"Don't wake up! Don't move! Anyone who talks, stand in the corner!" These were the commands barked at the country's teaching profession, and my article is prompted by the first indignant reaction. I have compared notes with many teachers: "Have you heard? Have you read it?" In reply, I heard angry (and in the case of men) sometimes unprintable replies.

But let me fill in the background.

Few people know that the calls for democratic, that is, fair elections on the eve of the 19th Party Conference were not the first of their kind; that there had been a precedent. In the summer of 1987, when the national congress of schoolteachers was to be held, schoolteachers, often branded dull and moribund, became the **first profession in the country's history** to speak out against malpractices in the election of deputies to the congress, against voting by the list compiled behind their backs, and to protest against the fact that teachers accounted for less than half the members of some delegations, because officials of various ranks had taken their places. Everyone was outraged that some innovative teachers, such as the remarkable Moscow teacher Sofia Lysenkova, whose book and method are followed by many primary school teachers, had not been elected to the congress.

Justice was restored. The wrongfully elected congress was postponed indefinitely. Teachers received the news with "a feeling of profound gratification." More good news followed: the organizing committee for the future congress was expanded to include pioneering teachers, and the first reports of its work were published. The State Committee for Education set up an ad hoc research group led by Eduard Dneprov, a specialist from the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences known for his profound and audacious articles in support of the grassroots teachers' movement. The aim of the group was to act as a think tank to produce ideas for the coming congress.

Everything seemed fine. But the teachers were worried about the postponed congress. In every audience of teachers, the first question asked was about the congress. When will it be called and what will it be like? Most important, will there be a new election?

The date of the congress has now been announced... The organizing committee, which was so widely hailed, is not even being mentioned. It has vanished into thin air. The announcement is on behalf of the State Committee for Education. The public affair that a congress is has become a departmental affair. It has been announced that the national congress of educationalists will be held in December 1988 and that delegates from secondary technical schools and higher educational institutions will be elected in addition to schoolteachers. What about schoolteachers? It says in black and white: "Persons elected as delegates to the national congress of teachers retain their delegate's mandates." Sic!

It is as if nothing had happened, as if there had been no letters, no meetings, no Party Conference with its new spirit – nothing! The congress of yesterday will be attended by delegates elected almost two years ago to vote on behalf of schoolteachers, despite the protests of the teachers themselves, who feel they have been gulled.

At the time of their election, one was a minister, another President of the Academy, yet another a leading official or his deputy. They have long vanished from the education scene, but they will go to the Kremlin Palace, wave their mandates and applaud. Applaud whom and what? They will vote – for what? It is said that among the elected delegates there are some worthy people. So what? Even regional Party secretaries now have to be elected twice – to the Party committee and the regional Soviet; worthy people can be elected a second time – no one would vote against a good teacher. As it is, Sofia Lysenkova or Eduard Dneprov, whose work the congress is supposed to discuss, will not be among the delegates. At the time of the election, he had not yet been noticed. Yet every day of perestroika brings more and more such people to prominence. They will be barred from the congress. Can you imagine a congress elected in 1918 convening in 1920?

Everything will be fine. The congress will be held and its decisions will be declared important, even history-making. But think how the country's teaching profession would have been regalvanized, revitalized and united if, with our new common political experience, teachers elected their delegates themselves, if the teachers saw that the Education Committee was willing to meet them half-way. The elections alone would be more useful than a hundred refresher courses. But that opportunity has been missed. The Education Committee has proved itself a poor educationalist.

And think of the language. Not "comrades," but "persons." It sounds like a subpoena. The committee responsible for people's education would do well to hire an educated person with a good command of Russian so that its papers do not bristle with "in the capacity of." It is only natural that teachers will talk to the children in their charge the way the state committee talks to them.

What, then, is the true face of the committee? A face turned to the teacher to talk and take counsel, or a face with cold eyes and tight lips bellowing into the loudspeaker with a policeman's voice: "Persons elected... Get it?"

Simon Soloveichik

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